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Quintilian on Pedagogical Love (*Amor*)

Gabriella Gelardini

Abstract

This chapter takes pedagogical love as its subject and focuses on Quintilian and his Institutio oratoria, an ancient author who is acclaimed for his contributions to rhetoric and education, but is largely overlooked when it comes to the theme of pedagogical love. Of particular interest is his introduction to his sixth book (Inst. 6 prooem.), not only because in it Quintilian emotionally laments the death of his entire family, but also—it is argued—because in it Quintilian's pedagogical love (amor) is laid out as the hermeneutical key to his entire pedagogical approach.

After an introduction (§1) and a discussion of Quintilian's vita (§2), Quintilian's emotional outburst in the introduction to his sixth book—with a view to his subsequent theory of emotions (Inst. 6.2)—is examined for its authenticity (§3). In the following chapter, the values of caring or education (cura), affection (adfectus), and love (amor), which are centrally related to pedagogical love, are elaborated in their larger context, including the conception of humanity on which these values are based (§4). This is extended by a selective discussion of the pedagogical means proffered by Quintilian on the basis of these values and persuasion rather than coercion (§5).

Finally, Quintilian's pedagogical amor is compared with the pedagogical eros, an approach which is increasingly being advocated again today, and it is shown that Quintilian's amor seems to be better protected against abuse than Plato's eros (§6). And finally, in connection with more recent approaches that position emotions in the realm of values and moral judgments, the usefulness of pedagogical love in today's everyday educational life is demonstrated (§7).

Keywords

Quintilian and Institutio oratoria (The Orator's Education); pedagogy and cura; pedagogical love and pedagogical eros; emotions, amor, and adfectus.

Author

Gabriella Gelardini, professor for Christianity, religion, worldview, and ethics (KRLE), Nord University, Bodø, Norway.

1. Introduction

When it came to finding a lecture topic for the conference *Virtus et Humanitas: Virtues and Values in Greco-Roman, Jewish and Christian Paideia at the Turn of the Common Era*, the basis for this publication, which combines the aspects of "values or virtues" and "education," I did not have to think long.[1] I immediately remembered Quintilian and his *Institutio*, which I had studied in preparation for a lecture, thinking in particular of his "emotional preface" to the sixth book—in an otherwise rather sober, almost encyclopedic text.[2]

In this introduction (*Inst*. 6 prooem.), a man otherwise crowned with success, a professor, "the most famous professor of rhetoric in Rome," laments a personal tragedy in an extraordinarily moving way.[3] It had befallen him, Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, to give his full name, after he had retired and hit him with full force (cf. *Inst*. 6 prooem. 2). Quintilian lost his entire family within just a few years at this advanced stage of his life. First his wife of only nineteen years, shortly afterward their younger son at the age of only five, and lastly—after an agonizingly long illness lasting eight months—their older son at the age of only ten (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 4–13). Left alone, the husband and father, who feels "once again orphaned and abandoned" (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 2, 5), is not afraid to give free rein to his emotions and, in expressing his love and devotion for his wife and children, his grief at their loss and his resignation in the face of this hard blow, to craft a memorable literary monument to them.[4]

What Quintilian expresses here has certainly been noted in the study of his twelve-book magnum opus entitled *Institutio oratoria* (*The Orator's Education*), considered the most comprehensive compendium on classical rhetoric and at the same time the most important work on education in Roman antiquity.[5] However, the various assessments could not be more contradictory, as while some interpreted his emotional tribute to the deceased as "excessive," others considered it "inauthentic."[6] The most

1 For information on the conference, held from May 29 to June 3, 2022, at Nord University in Bodø, Norway, see the website of the Enoch Seminar, https://enochseminar.org/13-norway-2022/. I am grateful to Dr. David E. Orton for proofreading this chapter.

2 Quintilian, *The Orator's Education*, ed. and trans. Donald A. Russell, 5 vols., LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). For his emotional preface, see Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:2.

3 Marcus Fabius Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners: Zwölf Bücher – Lateinisch und deutsch*, ed. and trans. Helmut Rahn, 5th ed. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2011), IX, 828.

4 Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 673 n. 3.

5 Marc van der Poel, "Quintilian's Underlying Educational Programme," in *The Oxford Handbook of Quintilian*, ed. Marc van der Poel, Michael Edwards, and James J. Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021), 80–100, esp. 80, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198713784.013.5; The importance of Quintilian and his *Institutio* can also be seen in its uninterrupted reception from the first century to the present day (Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 829); for an up-to-date and comprehensive overview of this reception history, see van der Poel, Edwards, and Murphy, *Oxford Handbook of Quintilian*, 313–505 (part IV: chs. 16–22).

6 For excessive, see Marc van der Poel, "Quintilian: The Biographical Tradition," in van der Poel, Edwards, and Murphy, *Oxford Handbook of Quintilian*, 7–23, esp. 17, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198713784.013.2. For inauthentic, see Matthew Leigh, "Quintilian on the Emotions (*Institutio oratoria* 6 preface and 1–2)," *JRS* 94 (2004): 122–40, https://doi.org/10.2307/4135012.

recent research locates itself centrally between these two poles and sees Quintilian's introduction as an "appropriate preface to the sixth book on emotions."[7]

In view of the fact that the death of the last member of the family, the beloved ten-year-old son with the same name, Quintilian, occurred during the writing of the *Institutio* (see §2), the question arises as to whether this literary monument represents more than just an "appropriate preface." Moreover, are there perhaps even links between the paternal love expressed here and Quintilian's promotion of such values as care (*cura*), affection (*adfectus*), and love (*amor*) in education? Does this confession of love, located roughly in the middle of his magnum opus, even have the status of a hermeneutical key that allows a deeper insight into and thus a better understanding of Quintilian's so-called reform pedagogical approach?

After this introduction (§1), I approach these questions first with a look at his *vita* (§2); then with a more detailed analysis of the introduction to his sixth book (§3). Against the background of this introduction, I then examine the role of *adfectus* and *amor* that Quintilian assigns to education and the conception of humanity on which he bases it (§4); I also examine the pedagogical consequences that Quintilian draws from this (§5). Finally, I compare Quintilian's pedagogical *amor* with Plato's pedagogical *eros* and conclude by discussing whether *amor* can still be a value in pedagogy today (§6) and, if so, what its use might be (§7).

Methodologically and in line with the guidelines of the conference, I follow a text-based historical approach, supplemented by philosophical-systematic and pedagogical-educational considerations. We shall begin, then, with a look at Quintilian's life, with a particular focus on formative events.

2. Quintilian's *Vita*

Quintilian's *Institutio* is the only surviving work from his pen. But even though it is an extensive work, he has not left us much autobiographical information. And if he does say something about himself here and there, his statements are rather unspecific and therefore difficult to date. Fortunately, in addition to those of Quintilian, we have testimonies from three other authors, albeit not comprehensive—and ambiguous ones at that: Martial (*Epigrams* 2.90.2), Ausonius (*Professors of Bordeaux* 1.7) and the church father Jerome (*Chronicon*, notes at year 68 and 88).[8]

2.1 Early Life and Education

Quintilian's year of birth cannot be clearly determined. Researchers have observed that he described himself as a "boy" (*puer*), "youth" (*adulescentulus*) or "young man" (*iuvenis*) for the period between the late 40s CE and the year 60, but because the age associated with these terms can vary widely, this evidence does not facilitate a precise

7 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 3:3; Poel, "Quintilian," 17.

8 Poel, "Quintilian," 7.

reconstruction of his year of birth. Suggestions offered therefore range from 30 to 42, but the year 35 CE is most frequently accepted as the year of Quintilian's birth.[9] This means that he was born during the principate, either during the reign of Tiberius (14–37 CE), the tyrant Caligula (37–41 CE) or Claudius (41–54 CE).[10] Whichever assumption one wishes to follow, they all make Quintilian a contemporary of such figures as Paul of Tarsus, an evangelist who has borne the name Mark since early church tradition, or Flavius Josephus, all three of whom were associated with Rome, a place that was also to become of eminent importance for Quintilian.

There are two suggestions as to Quintilian's place of birth, the majority view being that he came from the province of Hispania Tarraconensis and was therefore Spanish. At first glance, the testimony of Jerome, who called Quintilian "a man of Calagurri (today's Calahorra in northern Spain)" (*Chronicon*, note at the year 88 CE), would support this. This would also be supported by the testimony of Ausonius, who stated "that Calagurris is said to be proud to have Quintilian as its alumnus" (pupil or native, or else nourisher or educator; *Professors of Bordeaux* 1.7). However, doubts have been raised against this interpretation of the two testimonies, namely because Quintilian is conspicuously not mentioned by Martial (*Epigram* 2.90.2 in combination with 1.60) in a list of famous Spaniards. Alternatively, a minority has suggested that Quintilian was not from the provincial city but from the capital and was born in Rome itself. The testimonies of Jerome and Ausonius are then interpreted in such a way that they refer to a later time, when Quintilian worked there as a teacher and orator in adulthood.[11]

What can be reconstructed with relative certainty on the basis of his own statements is that Quintilian must have stayed in Rome toward the end of the 40s until around the year 59/60 CE. If he was a child of the capital, he would have enjoyed his entire education in Rome, but if he was a child of the provinces, the proponents of this assumption see in 9.3.73 of the *Institutio* evidence that he was brought to the capital at an early age by his father, who himself was probably also a man trained in rhetoric, like his grandfather (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 13).[12] Be that as it may, Quintilian enjoyed his education in Rome during the reign of Claudius and must have witnessed the transition to the reign of Nero in 54 CE.[13] Quintilian makes it known that he had heard various orators during this time, so that it can be assumed that Rome must have contributed greatly to his formation as an orator. He was apparently fond of one in particular, Domitius Afer, whom Quintilian had listened to as a "youth" (*adulescentulus*) according to his own testimony (*Inst*. 5.7.7) and whom he regarded as the "most important of all orators" he had ever heard. Quintilian had evidently adopted Afer as his model. Afer was characterized as a more austere, classical, Ciceronian

9 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:1; Poel, "Quintilian," 11.

10 Werner Eck, "Tiberius," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e1213370. Eck, "Caligula," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_bnp_e224860. Eck, "Claudius," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_bnp_e300310.

11 Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, IX; Poel, "Quintilian," 10–11, 19.

12 Poel, "Quintilian," 11–12.

13 Werner Eck, "Nero," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e820620.

speaker than those common at the time of Nero and his popular teacher Seneca the Younger.[14] Afer also may have inspired Quintilian's love of Cicero. As the latter was already advanced in years, Quintilian experienced and mentions his waning influence (*Inst*. 12.11.3) but not his death, which probably occurred in 59/60.[15]

2.2 Career

The fact that Quintilian says nothing about the death of his revered role model has been interpreted by some scholars to mean that he had already left the capital before 59/60. His having left Rome is also confirmed by one of the three external witnesses, Jerome, who states in connection with the year 68 that Quintilian returned to the capital in the same year, that is, 68 CE, after having left Rome some time previously. He had returned to the capital as part of Galba's entourage after the latter's term of office as governor of Hispania Tarraconensis had ended that year. This had begun in 61, which is why others assume that just as Quintilian had returned to Rome as part of Galba's entourage, he had also left the capital as part of it in 61 and not before 59/60.[16] Whatever the reason, we may conclude that Quintilian had left Rome after Nero's five good years—the so-called *Neronis quinquennio*[17]—and that in his association with Galba he had returned to Rome with one who, in alliance with others in the west, had not only risen up against Nero but had also been the first to challenge his rule.

Once in Rome, it is assumed that Quintilian opened a school of rhetoric there in the same year, 68. The fact that he had returned to the capital as a protégé of Galba, who had meanwhile replaced the hated Nero on the throne, may have helped him.[18] However, Rome was heading for turbulent times, as Galba had barely taken office when he was murdered by his rival Otho in 69, creating an uncertainty that Quintilian must have managed to survive, although he did not comment on it.[19] However, neither Otho's reign nor that of Vitellius after him were graced with good fortune.[20] It took a fourth emperor in this so-called Year of the Four Emperors—Vespasian—who had enjoyed success in putting down the Jewish revolt, to seal the start of a new direction and the opening of a new chapter in Rome's history.[21]

Vespasian and Quintilian seem to have agreed on one thing: If Rome wanted to prosper, it needed a return to Augustan ideals and values, which could be achieved not least through an education that was capable of raising a seriously trained and

14 Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 820.

15 Poel, "Quintilian," 9–10, 19–20.

16 Poel, "Quintilian," 12, 20.

17 Katharina Ackenheil, "'Goldene Zeiten' – Neros Herrschaftsantritt und die ersten Regierungsjahre," in *Nero: Kaiser, Künstler und Tyrann*, ed. Jürgen Merten, Schriftenreihe des Rheinischen Landesmuseums Trier 40 (Darmstadt: Theiss, 2016), 34–43, esp. 1.

18 Werner Eck, "Galba," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e417900.

19 Werner Eck, "Otho," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e902530.

20 Werner Eck, "Vitellius," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e12205980.

21 Werner Eck, "Vespasianus," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e12202340.

responsible elite.[22] Quintilian dedicated himself to precisely this goal and enjoyed state support in doing so (Jerome's note at the year 88; Suetonius, *Vesp*. 18; Zonaras 65.12).[23] He did it so successfully that by 85/86 Quintilian was a notable figure of the establishment, as statements in a poem published by Martial in the same year would have us believe. In it, he describes Quintilian as the "supreme controller of the wayward youth" and "glory of the Roman gown" (*Epigrams* 2.90), which is probably meant ironically with a begrudging view of his success.[24] That Quintilian's achievements also made him a rich man is indicated by statements in Juvenal (*Sat*. 6.75, 279–280; 7.186–189), according to which Quintilian had himself paid up to two thousand sestertii for the education of a pupil.[25]

It is generally assumed that his career in Rome thus spanned from 68 to 88.[26] It goes without saying that Quintilian was able to attract a large circle of students during his long and successful career there. He refers to them repeatedly in his *Institutio* (e.g., 1 prooem. 7; 3.6.68; 10.3.32), but without mentioning any names. It is certain that among them were some who later achieved fame themselves, at least in the case of Pliny the Younger, as he claims in his writings to have been taught by Quintilian (*Ep*. 2.14.9; 6.6.3). This was also assumed for Tacitus and Juvenal, although there is no documentary evidence for this.[27]

Quintilian was not only active as a teacher of rhetoric, he also made a name for himself as a judicial orator, but Quintilian does not provide any information about when he took up this work. However, a series of autobiographical statements give an impression of his activity, his abilities, and his success as an orator (*Inst*. 4.1.19; 6.1.39; 7.2.24; 9.2.73). The most prestigious of these (*Inst*. 4.1.19) was the one involving Queen Berenice, the Jewish princess with whom Vespasian's elder son Titus had fallen in love with in Judea when he had assisted his father in putting down the Jewish revolt (cf. Josephus *B.J.* 3–7). Presumably this happened during her stay in Rome between 75 and 79.[28]

2.3 Retirement and Death

After twenty years, when he was still in good health, Quintilian said that he retired from his public activities as a teacher and court orator (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 1; 2.12.12; 6 prooem. 6). If it is true that he had begun these in 68, he retired from public life—as mentioned—in 88. However, he did not do this in order to indulge in idleness, but rather to devote himself to writing and other tasks.

One of these tasks included the education of Domitian's great-nephew, who had succeeded his elder brother Titus on the throne in 81 after only two years in office,

22 Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 810–12.
23 Poel, "Quintilian," 12–15, 20.
24 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:2; Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, IX.
25 Poel, "Quintilian," 15.
26 Poel, "Quintilian," 12–13, 20.
27 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:3; Poel, "Quintilian," 14.
28 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:2; Poel, "Quintilian," 15–16.

and had chosen the two boys as his successors.[29] As the crowning glory of his fame, Quintilian was also awarded the title of consul during this period of his life, the so-called *consularia ornamenta* (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 13; Ausonius, *Gratiarum actio* 7.31; cf. Juvenal, *Sat*. 7.197), the highest honor that a nonsenator could receive in Rome.[30]

After writing a speech (*Inst*. 7.2.24), Quintilian set about writing *De causis corruptae eloquentiae* (*On the Reasons for the Decadence of Eloquence*; *Inst*. 6 prooem. 3; 8.6.76), both works are lost.[31] It was at this time, as Quintilian himself tells us, that his wife died. She died when she was only nineteen. She came from a good family, and Quintilian must have married her very young, given the age of the two children. Despite the considerable age difference, Quintilian loved her dearly, as he himself states (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 5), which suggests that she was his only wife.[32] But as if that were not enough, only a few months after his wife's death, their younger son too died at the age of only five, as Quintilian informs us (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 6–8).

Widowed and left with a last, now half-orphaned son—Quintilian had given him the same name as his—the grieving father set about writing his only surviving work after a period of mourning.[33] His intention, he informs us, was to dedicate it to his Quintilian, because assuming that the latter would survive him, the son could in this way "continue to have his father as his teacher" (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 1). Quintilian thus wrote his main work with his only remaining and beloved son in mind. It is not known exactly when the ten-year-old died, after eight agonizingly long months of illness, during or after the completion of the first draft of the *Institutio*. Quintilian had written the work in just over two years and put it aside, so he says, in order to mourn, it seems (cf. *Inst*. 6 prooem. 14), and to revise it—as he mentions—at a later date (*Inst*. prefatory letter to Trypho 1–2). However, owing to allegedly great demand and also the circulation of unauthorized lecture manuscripts (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 7; 7.2.24), he had submitted it to his printer Trypho—now rededicated—earlier than intended (*Inst*. prefatory letter to Trypho 1, 3).[34]

Nothing more is known about Quintilian from this point onward, and researchers have therefore assumed that he died shortly afterward. A precise year of death cannot be determined. However, it has been reconstructed that Quintilian must have completed his *Institutio* before the assassination of Domitian, in the year 96, because of some of the flattering statements it contains about him. He may even have finished it earlier and handed it over to his printer Trypho in or before 95, because the note on Domitian's two great-nephews (*Inst*. 4 prooem. 2; cf. 6 prooem. 1), which the latter had entrusted to Quintilian for his education, was not deleted. This would have been expedient, since their grandfather and Domitian's brother-in-law, Flavius Clemens,

29 Werner Eck, "Domitianus," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_dnp_e322490.

30 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:2; Poel, "Quintilian," 14, 16.

31 Poel, "Quintilian," 17.

32 Poel, "Quintilian," 18–19.

33 Quintilian does not mention any daughter or daughters, but that does not mean that there were none (*Orator's Education*, 1:2–3).

34 Quintilian dedicates the *Institutio* to his friend Marcellus Vitorius so that it may benefit the education of his still young but gifted son Geta (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 6; cf. also prefatory letter to Trypho 1; 1 prooem. 1; 4 prooem. 1; 6 prooem. 1, 16).

had fallen from grace and been executed in 95 on Domitian's orders (Suetonius, *Dom*. 15). Quintilian's death is therefore assumed by the majority of scholars to have occurred in Rome after the year 95 at the earliest.[35]

We may note that Quintilian proved to be someone who, after Nero's reign of terror, had placed his faith in traditional Augustan values, especially with regard to education. Quintilian bore witness to and survived a dramatic phase in the history of Rome, the disastrous end of Nero's reign, as well as the transition in 69, the Year of the Four Emperors, which was marked by civil war. But Quintilian also bore witness to the rebuilding of the empire under the Flavians. He made a significant contribution to this with his public service as a teacher of rhetoric and court orator. Quintilian achieved fame as a result, but his desire to pass on the "fruit of his labors" (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 2) not only to his students but also to his own flesh and blood was denied him. Thus the teacher and orator may have gotten his reward, but this was not granted to Quintilian the father. We turn next to the paternal lament and avowal of love in the preface to the sixth book of the *Institutio*.

3. Quintilian's Prooemium to the Sixth Book on Emotions

3.1 A Book on Rhetoric and Education

In the *Institutio oratoris*, Quintilian composed a work that was intended to teach the art of the speech, the *ars dicendi*. It was a subject that was taught at the third and highest level in the Roman education system of his day, usually to male pupils from elite families who could afford it. This was taught to around fifteen- or sixteen-year-olds over a period of twelve to fourteen years by a rhetorician in the context of either public or private instruction. The content included the exact study of all parts of the speech, familiarization with the genres of speech, as well as in-depth knowledge of classical Latin and Greek literature—the writing and delivery of practice speeches, the so-called *declamationes*. Here, future leaders were trained, who would one day have to stand up for themselves in state contexts such as the senate, the courts, or the military.[36]

What is special about Quintilian's work is that he not only had the educational zenith of the third level of teaching in mind, but also that of the second level, where around ten- to eleven-year-olds were taught to speak correctly by a *grammaticus* over five years, as well as that of the first level, where around six- to seven-year-olds were taught to read and write and do arithmetic by a *ludi magister* over four years.[37] Quintilian looks even further, however, as he also explores education beyond the

35 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:3; Poel, "Quintilian," 19–20.

36 Karl-Wilhelm Weeber, *Lernen und Leiden: Schule im Alten Rom* (Darmstadt: Theiss, 2014), 27–31.

37 Weeber, *Lernen und Leiden*, 16–27. Today's research no longer imagines the three-level system as three rigidly separate institutions; rather, the transitions must have been more fluid. Based on the *Institutio*, W. Martin Bloomer therefore reconstructs the school system in Quintilian's time as follows: "We can imagine … that the Roman boy or girl came to grammar school at age seven, eight, or nine already knowing the alphabet. Reading, writing, and arithmetic were learned here. The child would learn to write and then read Greek; Latin followed. After basic literacy (including memorization and recitation) the child learned grammar, mythology, and literary criticism all together while reading a

three-stage educational process and has the training or existence of the rhetorician from the cradle to the grave in mind (cf. *Inst.* 1 prooem. 6). Therefore, the *Institutio* not only combines knowledge of classical rhetoric, but also—as mentioned in the introduction (§1)—comprehensive knowledge of education as a whole, how it was practiced in Rome at his time, but also how Quintilian ideally envisioned it.[38]

Quintilian's special view of the entire life of a person to be educated is certainly also explained by the fact that he had his own, half-orphaned son Quintilian in mind when writing his work, through whom he—as mentioned (§2)—had hoped to remain a loving fatherly teacher even after his death. Quintilian was not alone in this aspiration, as Cato, for example, but also Cicero, whom Quintilian admired highly, and Seneca the Elder had already bequeathed educationally relevant works to their respective offspring. This is an expression of a constant in Rome's more than thousand-year history, namely that education was first and foremost a private matter, which was primarily the responsibility of the Roman *pater familias*.[39]

3.2 Content

Quintilian organized his material on education and rhetoric—as mentioned (§1)—in twelve books, from which, following Donald A. Russell, seven larger themes emerge:[40]

The *first part* (books 1.1–3.5) contains introductory and prefatory material, for example on:

1. Educational preliminaries: dealing with such matters as (1) learning to read and write as well as linguistic teaching; (2) other disciplines (such as logic, music, or geometry) and teachers (such as actors or gymnastic trainers); or (3) diagnosing abilities and corporal punishment.
2. First stages of the rhetor's teaching: dealing with such matters as (1) relationship between rhetor and pupil; (2) the beginner's need of the best teachers; or (3) on setting, teaching, and correcting declamations.
3. Prolegomena to rhetoric: dealing with such matters as (1) its necessity; (2) definition; or (3) whether it is a virtue.

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poetic text and listening to the teacher's exposition. The grammar school teacher would deliver a brief opening lecture. The child might recite an assigned passage. The teacher would proceed to comment on the spelling, diction, and rhetorical figures of the passage (the scholiasts, particularly Servius on the *Aeneid* and Priscian in his *Partitiones*, give an idea of the qualities of this instruction). A set of exercises from the aphorism to fable and description, up through a series of increasingly complex narrative building blocks, led to the finished speech. At the final stage, known as declamation, the advanced [male] student learned a system of composition and delivery of mock deliberative and legal speeches." See Bloomer, *The School of Rome: Latin Studies and the Origins of Liberal Education* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011), 10.

38 Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 810.

39 Weeber, *Lernen und Leiden*, 12–13.

40 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 1:12–18; cf. also James J. Murphy, "The Structure and Contents of the *Institutio oratoria*," in van der Poel, Edwards, and Murphy, *Oxford Handbook of Quintilian*, 59–78, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198713784.013.4.

4. Further prolegomena: history and categorizations of the subject: dealing with such matters as (1) earlier writers on the subject; (2) the five parts of rhetoric: invention, disposition, elocution, memory, and delivery; or (3) three causes, which are forensic, deliberative, and epideictic.

The *second part* (books 3.6–6.5) deals with the first aspect of rhetoric, namely the *inventio*, that is, the inventing of the topic or finding of the material, and covers topics such as:

1. Theory
2. Epideictic
3. Deliberative
4. Forensic: dealing with such matters as (1) its basic structure: *prooemium*, narrative, proofs, refutations, and epilogue; (2) line of defense; or (3) proofs and witnesses. In the sixth book, Quintilian also devotes himself to emotions in connection with the epilogue of court speeches. It is this sixth book that he opens with the aforementioned preface, in which he laments the bereavement of his entire family.

The *third part* (book 7.1–10) focuses on the second aspect of rhetoric, namely the *dispositio*, and deals with such topics as:

1. Structures
2. Conflict of laws
3. Analogy
4. Ambiguity

The *fourth part* (books 8.1–11.1) addresses the third part of rhetoric, namely the *elocutio*, and deals with topics such as:

1. Virtue of Latinity
2. Virtue of lucidity
3. Virtue of ornament
4. Virtue of decorum or appropriateness

The *fifth part* (book 11.2) discusses the fourth part of rhetoric, namely memory.

The *sixth part* (book 11.3) discusses the fifth and final part of rhetoric, namely the delivery.

And the *seventh* and *final part* (book 12) looks at the finished orator and moral issues, and deals with such topics as:

1. The good man skilled in speaking
2. Rhetoric and philosophy

3. The importance of personality
4. Retirement and conclusion

3.3 Preface to the Sixth Book

Quintilian begins his preface to the sixth book, which he addresses to his friend Marcellus Vitorius, with an insight into his intentions in writing it. He had written his work, which he began at his friend's request (cf. also *Inst*. 1 proom. 1), with the intention that it should be of use to the youth of his time; moreover with a view to the duty of educating princes that had recently been entrusted to him; and he had done all this, says Quintilian, not without thinking of his only remaining son:

> All the time, however, I was considering also my own pleasure, because I hoped to leave this, as the best part of his inheritance, to my own son [Quintilian], whose outstanding abilities justified even obsessive care on a father's part. I intended that, if fate cut me off—and this would have been fair and greatly to be wished—he would still have his father as his teacher. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 1 [Russell])[41]

Quintilian had thought the world of his only remaining ten-year-old son, Quintilian, and therefore could not believe that fate would snatch this only hope of his old age away from him as well:

> Day and night I worked at it, hastened by the fear of my own mortality, until Fortune so laid me low in an instant that the fruit of my labours came to matter to no one less than to me. Bereavement struck me a second time; I lost the child of whom I had such expectations, and in whom I rested the sole hope of my old age. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 2)

This second loss, together with the first, the death of his younger son, had robbed the father of his joie de vivre:

> What am I to do now? What service am I to think that I can still do when the gods so fight against me? For it happened that I had been struck by a like blow when I began to write my book on the "Causes of the Decadence of Eloquence." Only one right course remained: to cast this ill-fated work and whatever wretched learning I have upon that untimely pyre whose flames were to consume the issue of my loins, and not to aggravate by fresh labours the offence of my continuance in life. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 3)

The death of his beloved wife before the loss of his two sons had already left him as someone whom nothing in the world could make happy:

> What good parent could forgive me for finding the strength to go on with my studies? Who would not feel disgust at my insensitivity, if I could find any use for my voice except to blame the gods for letting me survive all those I loved, and to bear witness

41 All subsequent quotations follow the text edition and translation provided by Russell in LCL.

> that no Providence looks down on earth? My own destiny may indeed not give rise to any such thoughts (for my only crime is that I am still alive) but the fate of those condemned undeservedly to a premature death most surely does. I had lost their mother first: before even her nineteenth year had passed, having borne two sons, she was snatched away by a cruel and untimely fate. Yet she did not die unhappy; it was I who was so laid low just by this one misfortune that no subsequent chance could make me happy. Not only did her death bring her husband incurable grief, for she possessed every virtue that woman can have, but also, given her age (especially compared with mine), her loss too could be thought of as like the loss of a child. Yet, since her children survived her and I was in good health—it was very wrong, but it was what she herself prayed for—her premature end saved her from terrible afflictions. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 4–6)

With the death of his two children, his "two lights of life" were extinguished, Quintilian affectionately describes his children, and recounts the "promising flowers" he had already recognized in the five-year-old:

> My younger son, just past his fifth year, went first, and took away one of the two lights of my life. I have no desire to flaunt my troubles or exaggerate the causes of my tears: I only wish there were some way of making them less! But how can I conceal what beauty he showed in his face, what charm in his talk, what flashes of intellect, what solid possession of a calm and even at that age almost unbelievably lofty mind? This was a child who would have deserved love [*amor*], even if he had been another's. It was a further trick of Fortune, meant to torment me even more, that this delightful child preferred me to his nurses, preferred me to the grandmother who brought him up, preferred me to all those who commonly win the affections of little children. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 6–8)

The older one not only showed "promising flowers," but also "sure and well-formed fruits" thanks to the extraordinary talent of this ten-year-old, so Quintilian:

> Henceforward, I depended entirely on the hopes and delights given to me by my little Quintilian. He could be comfort enough. He had shown not just promising flowers, like his brother, but, by the time he entered his tenth year, sure and well-formed fruits. I swear by my own troubles, by the misery that my heart knows, by those spirits of the departed who are the gods of my grief, that I saw [*videre*] in him excellences not only of natural capacity for learning (and I never saw anything more outstanding in all my experience) and of application, which even at that age needed no compulsion (as his teachers know), but also of honesty, piety, humanity, and generosity, such that one might indeed have found in them cause to fear the lightning stroke; for it has often been observed that early ripening means a quicker fall, and that there is some envious power that cuts short great promise, presumably to prevent our blessings being prolonged beyond what man is allowed to enjoy. He had all the fortuitous advantages too: a clear and pleasant voice, a sweetness of speech, and an exact pronunciation of every letter in either of the two languages, as though it was the one he was born to. All this was still only promise: he had other qualities already ripe—constancy, dignity, strength to face even pain and fear. With what courage, with what admiration on the part of his doctors, did he bear his eight months of illness! How he comforted me in his last hours! How, when he was failing and no longer part of our world, did the wanderings of his delirium dwell on school and on his studies!

> O my unfulfilled hope, did I indeed see your fading eyes, your fleeting breath? Did I have strength to embrace your cold and lifeless body, to receive your last breath, and still myself breathe the common air, I who deserve to bear these torments and to think these thoughts? (Have I then lost) you, when your recent adoption into a consular family brought you nearer to hopes of the highest offices, when you were destined to be the son-in-law and nephew of a praetor, when you were a candidate for your grandfather's eloquence—I, your father, who live on only to suffer? May my endurance of life—not indeed my wish for it—make reparation to you for the rest of my days! It is in vain that we shift all our troubles on to Fortune. No one mourns long save by his own fault. (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 9–13)

In Quintilian's lament for the dead, three things are noteworthy for the context of this chapter. First, that the death of both his wife and his younger son prompted Quintilian to preserve the paternal teacher for his only surviving elder son even after his own death in the form of this book. But second, he probably undertook the effort not only because of the situation, or because the responsibility of education lay with him as a father, but undoubtedly also because he sincerely loved (*amor*) his only remaining son—as he already did the younger son and his wife. And finally, the touching description of his sons reveals an approach that seems to be constitutive in Quintilian's thinking about education, namely the will and the ability to see (*videre*) the gifts inherent in a child.

3.4 Criticism

The fact that Quintilian's introduction to his sixth book, dedicated to emotions, has not only had its admirers was mentioned at the beginning (§1). A critic of recent research, Matthew Leigh, for example, castigates Quintilian as an "artful manipulator," his response to his loss as a "disquieting performance" and his remarks as "unabashed emotionalism," which would make what Quintilian really felt or experienced appear "impenetrably opaque."[42]

These are harsh words, and in the search for reasons why someone arrives at such a judgment, they can certainly be found in Quintilian himself, namely in the text that follows his preface. The context, in which this *prooemium* is set is the concluding part or epilogue of the judicial speech (*genus iudicale*). And this, Quintilian explains, is the most important part of every judicial speech, because it is mainly based on emotional effects, those by means of which the judge's feelings are to be influenced (*Inst*. 6.2.1). And What is the best way to influence a judge's feelings? Quintilian freely reveals the secret of the art of arousing emotions, namely in that the court orator himself indulges in the stirring-up of emotions, for, he adds: "Why else should mourners, at least when their grief is fresh, seem sometimes to show great eloquence in their cries?" (*Inst*. 6.2.26)? Now, Quintilian knows from his own experience that emotions are stirred by grief, but How is it possible to be moved without a cause, since emotions seem to be beyond our control? Quintilian also has an answer to this question, φαντασίαι or *visiones*, that is, the ability to visualize absent things in the

42 Leigh, "Quintilian on the Emotions," 139, 122, 139.

mind in such a way that we seem to see them before our eyes and have them before us as if in the flesh (*Inst*. 6.2.29). This ability is not difficult, Quintilian continues, since most of us already practice it in the context of daydreaming (*Inst*. 6.2.30). The stage is also a place, Quintilian continues, where it can be witnessed that actors and comedians can become deeply moved simply by reciting fictionalized emotions (*Inst*. 6.2.35). In preparation for everyday life as a court orator, it is therefore appropriate to allow oneself to be moved by such court speeches even in school exercises, a talent with which Quintilian has made a name for himself, for, he concludes, "I have certainly often been moved, to the point of being overtaken not only by tears but by pallor and by a grief which is very like the real thing" (*Inst*. 6.2.36).

After such statements, can the authenticity of Quintilian's lament in his preface to the sixth book still be trusted? Well, another critic, José-Domingo Rodríguez Martín, himself familiar with daily court life, judges the matter as follows:

> There is no doubt that the inclusion of that beautiful *proemium* at the beginning of a book dedicated to feelings was intentional .... I ... believe that Quintilian was sharing his feeling with his readers. For that reason I prefer to think that the master was indeed acting, but in a different way: better than anyone else, Quintilian personifies his own vision of the advocate as an actor .... He teaches us, thus, a lesson about professionalism: as advocates, our mood does not matter, but that of our defendants does; as teachers, that of our students. His litigation, his education, his laughter matters. Therefore, both on the courtroom and classroom stages, in both of which settings Quintilian was an expert, the only criterion will always be the same and today it still rules the honourable profession of those who, day by day, climb on the stage to awaken feelings: *the show must go on*.[43]

The harsh blow of fate that Quintilian suffered had shaken him, although he explicitly distanced himself from ambition in misfortune as well as exaggeration in mourning, as he says (*Inst*. 6 prooem. 7). The fact that he nevertheless moved his readers with the literary memorial he erected to his beloved family, and still moves today, proves the point he makes in the text that follows, namely that those who are moved are able to move others, regardless of whether the circumstances are real or imagined. The point Quintilian wishes to convey, thus, is moving by being moved and not authenticity. Therein lies the reason, I believe, why one can agree with those scholars who consider Quintilian's preface to be a "masterpiece of emotional writing."[44]

Three further points deserve attention in this context. First, that infancy and early child mortality was really high at that time, including among the upper class.[45] Second, that

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43 Rodríguez Martín, "Moving the Judge: A Legal Commentary on Book VI of Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*," in *Quintilian and the Law: The Art of Persuasion in Law and Politics*, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003), 157–67, esp. 166–67.

44 Quintilian, *Orator's Education*, 3:3.

45 Tim Parkin, "The Demography of Infancy and Early Childhood in the Ancient World," in *The Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education in the Classical World*, ed. Judith Evans Grubbs and Tim Parkin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 40–61, esp. 44, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199781546.013.002.

> in the first century BCE, major developments occurred in the portrayal of children, who henceforth became more regular subjects in commemorative media and in other artistic genres. From early imperial times children featured in the decorative schemes of public monuments and were to be found consistently in official art from the reign of Augustus to the early third century, may it be in funerary reliefs and altars, in decorative panels and sarcophagi or also in literary monuments such as that of Quintilian.[46]

And finally, Quintilian may have wanted to emulate his revered role model Cicero, who sought to alleviate his grief over the death of his beloved daughter Tullia by writing the (lost) *Consolatio* (45 BCE).[47] This was possibly in deliberate contrast to his not exactly esteemed contemporary Seneca, who in his consolation to Marcia (*De consolatione ad Marciam*, ca. 40 CE) had no better advice to give her than that she should finally put her grief over the death of her beloved son Metilius behind her.[48]

With the above discussion, I have joined the majority of those voices that doubt neither the authenticity of Quintilian's feelings expressed in the preface, nor the quality, appropriateness, or placing of his literary monument. As a next step, it is necessary to examine whether Quintilian's guiding emotion of paternal love is also suitable as a hermeneutical key to a deeper understanding of his approach to education in the *Institutio*. We want to do this by taking a closer look at his values *adfectus* and *amor* as well as the conception of humanity that Quintilian bases them on.

4. Quintilian's Values of *Adfectus* and *Amor* and His Underlying Conception of Humanity

4.1 Human Nature

Quintilian had great faith in the gift of oratory, indeed, it could even put an ardent orator into a godlike state, as he repeatedly illustrates with the example of Pericles, who—as he recalls in reference to Aristophanes (*Ach*. 530–531)—no longer spoke, but "flashed" and "thundered" like Zeus (*Inst*. 2.16.19; 12.10.24, 65).

It is hardly a coincidence that Quintilian cites a statesman—one of the leading Athenians of the fifth century BCE—rather than a philosopher as an example here. Although he readily admits the usefulness of philosophical knowledge, the matters of governance do not belong to the realm of philosophy, but by law to that of oratory (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 11). Following Cicero, he recalls that philosophy and oratory, and

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46 Lena Larsson Lovén, "Children and Childhood in Roman Commemorative Art," in Grubs and Parkin, *Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education*, 302–21, esp. 302–3, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199781546.013.015; cf. also Beryl Rawson, *Children and Childhood in Roman Italy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. ch. 8 on "Death, Burial, and Commemoration," 336–63.

47 Susan Treggiari, *Terentia, Tullia and Publilia: The Women of Cicero's Family*, Women in the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 2007), 13, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203698549.

48 Seneca, "Ad Marciam de consolatione – Trostschrift für Marcia," in *Schriften zur Ethik: Die kleinen Dialoge – Lateinisch-deutsch*, ed. and trans. Gerhard Fink, Sammlung Tusculum (Düsseldorf: Artemis & Winkler, 2008), 310–87, https://doi.org/10.1515/9783050092010.310.

thus wisdom and its practical effect in life, were once united, but were then divided, and the good gift of eloquence was misused to defend what was only apparently good, that is, what was outwardly good but in reality bad (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 11–13).[49] For, Quintilian accuses, obviously addressing Seneca and his most famous offspring Nero:[50] "But in our day, very great vices have been concealed under this name in many persons. They did not try by virtue or learning to be regarded as philosophers; instead, they put on a gloomy face and an eccentric form of dress as a cover for their immorality" (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 15).

This combination of the wise and the practical can only be achieved by an orator today, according to Quintilian, but this presupposes that an orator also embodies this wisdom, which is why he concludes that only a truly good man can be an orator (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 9; 12.2 et passim). However, perfect manly virtue is not enough, it needs to be supplemented by perfect knowledge and the gift of finding the right word in the service of the people—be it in court, in the senate, or in the military (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 18). Quintilian is convinced that the height of oratorical perfection existed not only at the time of Pericles, but also in his present time, and that human nature is not an obstacle to reaching it (*Inst*. 1 prooem. 20; cf. also 2.16).

The special thing that Quintilian identifies in human nature is the gift of speech. He illustrates this with a comparison between humans and animals, which from a contemporary perspective can certainly be criticized:[51]

> And indeed, that first god, the father of all things and the maker of the universe, distinguished man from other living creatures that are subject to death by nothing so much as the faculty of speech [*dicendi facultate*]. We see in dumb animals bodies which surpass ours in size, strength, robustness, endurance, and speed, and we see that they need less external aids than we do. They know naturally, and without any teacher, how to run and feed and swim across water. Many are clothed against cold by the resources of their own bodies, have weapons born with them, and food almost always at hand; all these things give men much trouble. And so the creator gave us Reason [*rationem*] as our special gift, and chose that we should share it with the immortal gods. Yet Reason itself would not help us so much, or be so evident in us, if we did not have the power to express the thoughts we have conceived in our minds; it is this, rather than some degree of understanding and thought, which we see to be lacking in other animals. Making soft beds, weaving nests, rearing and hatching the young, even storing up food against the winter, and other works which we cannot imitate (like making honey and wax)—all these are perhaps signs of a certain degree of Reason; but since the creatures which do these things lack speech, they are said to be dumb and irrational. Finally, how little does heaven's gift of mind help humans who have been denied a voice! (*Inst*. 2.16.12–17)

49 Cf. Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, X.

50 Quintilian explicitly swamps Seneca with devastating criticism in *Inst*. 10.1.125–131. For Nero, see Quintilianus, *Ausbildung des Redners*, 816.

51 Cf. e.g. Christine M. Korsgaard, *Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).

The gift of speech, then, is the best thing that the gods have given to man, and this is due to human reason (*ratio*) or the spirit (*animus*), which Quintilian, according to the above quotation, understands as a heavenly power, and thus, as he says in *Inst*. 1.1.1, is of heavenly origin.

Since all humans—as well as animals—are naturally endowed with reason, Quintilian, contrary to a widespread opinion at the time, considers all humans, including children, to be fundamentally capable of learning, albeit to varying degrees (cf. *Inst*. 1.3.1–5). If a child does not succeed, Quintilian concludes ahead of his time, it is not nature that has failed, but care (*cura*), or in other words, education (*Inst*. 1.1.1–3).

4.2 The Pedagogues' Attitude and the Pupils' Duty

According to Quintilian's ideal, all the individuals in the household are responsible for the education of a child—especially those boys who were destined for future service as orators—and they should all take the greatest possible care to develop this innate divine gift of speech in the child as early as possible. This includes not only the fathers, but also the mothers, close family members such as grandparents, nurses, and pedagogues, not seldom from slave backgrounds (*Inst*. 1.1.4–11).

And once the children are ready for school, the teacher comes into play. And Quintilian ideally imagines his attitude as a fatherly one: "First of all, then, let [the teacher] adopt a paternal [*parentis*] attitude towards his pupils, and regard himself as taking the place of those whose children are entrusted to him" (*Inst*. 2.2.4).

Quintilian wishes the relationship between teacher and pupil to be one of friendship and affection:[52] "It is very important to ensure that [a good teacher] becomes in every way on terms of friendship [*amicus*] with [his pupils], and looks at his teaching as a matter not of duty but of affection [*adfectum*]" (*Inst*. 1.2.15).

Hereby he combines affection for children with showing an interest in them. And against the background of his conception of humanity outlined above, this should result not only in seeing the talents naturally inherent in children, but also in the desire to place all hopes in them. According to Quintilian, this seeing and hopeful expectation are among the foundations of education, which is why he mentions them in the very first paragraph of his work as follows:

> As soon as his son is born, the father should form the highest expectations of him. He will then be more careful about him from the start. There is no foundation for the complaint that only a small minority of human beings have been given the power to understand what is taught them, the majority being so slow-witted that they waste time and labour. On the contrary, you will find the greater number quick to reason and prompt to learn. This is natural to man. (*Inst*. 1.1.1)

52 According to Raffaella Cribiore, pictorial representations on terracotta, e.g., as well as textual evidence from various papyri, allow the assumption that there existed close relationships between teachers and pupils in antiquity. See Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind: Greek Education in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 60.

Like the loving father, the good teacher should also be aware of the divine disposition of his pupils. Like him, he should place all hope in them, in expectation of the full development of their potential. And the experienced teacher is able to recognize this potential in the same way as the loving father: "As soon as a boy is entrusted to him, the skilled teacher will first spy [*perspiciet*] out his ability [*ingenium*] and his nature [*naturam*]" (*Inst*. 1.3.1).

However, the right attitude, connection, and vision are not enough to inspire love in the students. According to Quintilian, it is also essential to maintain moderation with sternness:

> Let [the good teacher] be free of vice himself and intolerant of it in others. Let him be strict but not grim, and friendly but not too relaxed, so as to incur neither hatred [*odium*] nor contempt. He should talk a great deal about what is good and honourable; the more often he has admonished his pupils, the more rarely will he need to punish them. He must not be given to anger, but he must not turn a blind eye to things that need correction; he must be straightforward in his teaching, willing to work, persistent but not obsessive. He must answer questions readily, and put questions himself to those who do not ask any. In praising his pupils' performances he must be neither grudging nor fulsome: the one produces dislike of the work, the other complacency. In correcting faults, he must not be biting, and certainly not abusive. Many have been driven away from learning because some teachers rebuke pupils as though they hate them. He should himself deliver at least one speech, preferably several, a day, for his class to take away with them. For even if he provides them with plenty of examples for imitation from their reading, better nourishment comes, as they say, from the "living voice," and especially from a teacher whom, if they are properly taught, the pupils love and respect [*amant et verentur*]. It is difficult to overestimate how much readier we are to imitate those whom we like. (*Inst*. 2.2.5–8)

However, successful teaching is not solely the responsibility of the good teacher. It also requires willing pupils, and Quintilian has a single but essential piece of advice for them:

> Having said a good deal about teachers' duties, I have, for the time being, only one piece of advice for pupils: that they should love [*ament*] their teachers as they do their studies, and think of them as the parents not of their bodies but of their minds [*parentes … mentium*]. This feeling of affection will do much for their studies. They will be ready to listen, have confidence in what is said, and want to be like the teacher; they will go to classes cheerfully and eagerly, they will not be angry when corrected, they will be pleased when they are praised, they will try to earn affection by their application. (*Inst*. 2.9.1–2)

If both teacher and pupil fulfill their roles, a unification takes place—and here Quintilian uses generative metaphors—as can be observed in nature or in the sex act: "As the teachers' business is to teach, so [the pupil's] … to make themselves teachable. Neither is sufficient without the other. And just as it takes two parents to produce a human being, and seed is scattered in vain if the ground has not been softened in advance to nurture it, so eloquence cannot develop unless teacher and learner work in harmony together" (*Inst*. 2.9.3).

4.3 Persuasion versus Force

Anyone hearing Quintilian's generative metaphor may be immediately reminded of Plato's pedagogical *eros*, but Quintilian expressly does not mean a physical sexual union between teacher and pupil, nor between older and younger pupils. Although pederasty did occur in Rome, here, unlike in classical Athens, it was not considered a valid means of education, but an immorality.[53] Quintilian therefore draws a clear line between parental love and sensual or physical eroticism (cf. *Inst*. 2.2.14–15).

Even more harshly, Quintilian condemns, albeit only implicitly, the eroticism derived from sadism in connection with the corporal punishment widely practiced in antiquity (*Inst*. 1.3.14–17).[54] It was widely regarded as a legitimate means of forcing free children, but also slaves, to do what was considered right, or, more recently in his time, to punish children who failed to do so (*Inst*. 1.3.15). Quintilian prominently opposes corporal punishment in a lone voice with the words: "Flogging a pupil is something I do not at all like" (*Inst*. 1.3.14).[55] He justifies this with the insight that this kind of coercion, and any kind of coercion in general, is detrimental to the will to learn:

> However, everyone must be given some relaxation, not only because there is nothing that can stand perpetual strain—even things which are without sense or life need to be relaxed by periods of rest in order to preserve their strength—but also because study depends on the will to learn, and this cannot be forced. Thus renewed and refreshed, they will bring to their learning both more energy and that keener spirit which so often resists compulsion. (*Inst*. 1.3.8–9)

Quintilian's insight that eagerness to learn is based on free will is not only remarkable, but, as W. Marin Bloomer has shown very plausibly, downright revolutionary in the context of Greco-Roman educational practice, because Quintilian thus recognized the "child as a learning subject" for the first time, something that before him had only been thought of with regard to the male adult elite.[56] And as an alternative to

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53 Apart from a few exceptions, sexual relationships with boys in Rome were only cultivated in the area of prostitution or with slaves, which is why such relationships were generally not guided by pedagogical motives. See Elke Hartmann, "Päderastie," *BNP*, https://doi.org/10.1163/1574–9347_bnp_e903570. Weeber, *Lernen und Leiden*, 93–94.

54 For sadism, see W. Martin Bloomer, "Corporal Punishment in the Ancient School," in *A Companion to Ancient Education*, ed. W. Martin Bloomer, Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World (Chichester: Wiley & Sons, 2015), 184–98, esp. 197, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119023913.ch12. For corporal punishment, see p. 185.

55 The next ones to oppose corporal punishment, according to Bloomer were Plutarch in the second century (cf. the text *Lib. ed.* 8f–9a attributed to him) and Himerius in the fourth century (cf. *Oration* 66). That corporal punishment should be avoided as far as possible was also propagated by John Chrysostom in the fourth century (*Inan. glor.* 30; Bloomer, "Corporal Punishment in the Ancient School," 195). However, Quintilian finds corporal punishment appropriate for slaves (cf. *Inst*. 1.3.14), who in antiquity could be severely beaten, sexually molested, and even tortured (Bloomer, "Corporal Punishment in the Ancient School," 190).

56 W. Martin Bloomer, "Quintilian on the Child as a Learning Subject," *CW* 105 (2011): 109–37, https://doi.org/10.1353/clw.2011.0103. Bloomer, "Corporal Punishment in the Ancient School," 185, 197.

coercion, Quintilian offered something completely different and more in line with the values of affection and love, namely persuasion.[57] We shall take a look at what this means in concrete terms in the next section.

But before we do so, let us note the essence of this section. Quintilian considers all human beings to be endowed with a mind or spirit that not only connects them with the divine, but also enables them to put what they think into words. This is sufficient reason to regard every child as naturally gifted. Now, in addition to the nature of a child, it is important to see the gifts associated with it and to place all hopes in them. They come to fruition with loving care or education, one that recognizes that eagerness to learn cannot be based on coercion, but only on free will. In these key points, Did Quintilian not demonstrate what he as a father claims to have embodied toward his sons (cf. §3)? Did he not see in them from earliest childhood the gifts given by nature? Did he not love the boys with all his heart? And Did he not provide them with the most attentive care for as long as they lived? There is a parallel here that can hardly be coincidental, since—as mentioned above (§3)—the *Institutio* was written with his beloved son in mind. It is this parallelism, it seems, that lends support to the hypothesis put forward at the beginning that Quintilian's love for his own sons is a hermeneutical key to the understanding of his pedagogical approach.

5. Quintilian's Pedagogical Practice

So What does a *cura* or pedagogy based on *adfectus* and *amor* that propagates persuasion as the best means of learning progress look like? Let us recall that in the ideal conception that Quintilian outlines of educators on the one hand and students on the other, what he calls a receptive spirit or fertile soil is being created (cf. §4), and perhaps, translated into today's language, a climate of well-being, which he regards as an essential prerequisite for the will to learn—and thus for the learning process.

5.1 Promoting Means

Quintilian offers countless pieces of practical advice, many of which are specifically aimed at the training of the rhetor, for example, from the stylus of the wax tablet, which the infant should hold in a certain way (cf. *Inst*. 1.1.27–29), to how the trained rhetor should adopt a masculine appearance for public speaking (cf. *Inst*. 11.3.137–144). Since this chapter focuses less on the training of ancient rhetors, the following is a selection of pedagogical advice that is or may still be relevant in today's context.

57 W. Martin Bloomer neatly sums up the difference between coercion or violence and persuasion with the following sentence: "Force makes all mine and nothing thine. It takes away the counterclaim as it attacks the bodily integrity of the other. Persuasion may come to the same result [as force], but it is supposed to make an interior change on thine—to change the body from within, by the action of that body's mind" ("Corporal Punishment in the Ancient School," 191).

It has been said that for Quintilian it is important that the good teacher—like a loving father—looks out for the gifts of his pupils (§4). But to see means to recognize what the gifts of each student are in detail. And those who recognize these also see the differences between the pupils. According to Quintilian, attention should be paid to these differences in talent and the pupils should be encouraged according to their talents (*Inst*. 2.8.1–7). Specifically, in such a way that the pupils are offered all the necessary content that they need for the task they are about to perform (*Inst*. 2.8.8–10; cf. also 2.8.11–15)—an insight that empirical pedagogy also adopted in the twentieth century (see §6).

But the content offered to pupils should be abundant (*Inst*. 2.2.8), according to Quintilian, and it should be presented understandably (*Inst*. 2.2.5). All pupils should be challenged moderately and persistently, the gifted ones more, but without overburdening them (*Inst*. 1.2.27–29; 2.2.5).

Questions from pupils should be answered readily, and by means of questions—Quintilian says—the teacher should also involve shy or passive pupils in the class (*Inst*. 2.2.6). Questions are ideal for young children who are not yet capable of intellectual work (*Inst*. 1.1.20–21).

Quintilian states that breaks are important so that the children can recover and find their way back to the will to learn, which for him is crucial (*Inst*. 1.3.8–9).

Play could also provide recreation, but it should be used in moderation to prevent idleness (*Inst*. 1.3.10–11). Quintilian identifies competition as a special form of play, as it can arouse envy of better students, but if it can be turned into a competitive spirit, it can serve as an incentive to learn (*Inst*. 1.1.20; 1.2.23–26; cf. also 1.2.27–29).

According to Quintilian, rewards are particularly useful for young children, but also for older people, and praise is a special form of reward (*Inst*. 1.1.20; 1.3.6). Praise should be given neither sparingly nor lavishly, and only if it is really justified (*Inst*. 2.2.6; 2.2.10–13). Pupils may also praise the teacher, for example, by applauding, but this praise should be moderate so that the pupil does not become dependent on the teacher demanding this praise (*Inst*. 2.2.9).

5.2 Corrective Means

If the pupil fails in a task, he should be corrected without scolding, but rather in a friendly, loving and age-appropriate manner (*Inst*. 2.2.5; 2.2.7; 2.4.12; 2.4.14). Quintilian illustrates this cautious approach with an agrarian metaphor:

> It is worth noting too that boys' minds sometimes cannot stand up to undue severity in correction. They despair, they feel hurt, they come ultimately to hate the work, and (most damaging of all) they make no effort because they are frightened of everything. Farmers know this: they do not believe in applying the pruning hook to the tender leaves, because these seem to be afraid of the knife and not yet able to bear a scar. So at this stage the teacher should be particularly kind, so that the remedies, which are otherwise harsh by nature, can be made easier by a gentle touch. He must praise some things, tolerate others, suggest changes (always also giving reasons for them), and brighten up passages by putting in something of his own. He will sometimes also find it useful to dictate whole themes

> himself for the boy to imitate and sometimes love as if they were his own. If, however, the written work is so careless that it cannot be corrected, I have found that it helped if I treated the same theme again myself and made my pupil write it out afresh, telling him he could do even better; for nothing makes for happy work as much as hope. But different ages need different methods of correction, and the original assignment and the correction have both to be proportionate to the pupil's strength. I used to say to boys who ventured on some rather free or exuberant expression that I approved of it now, but the time would come when I should not let it pass. So they were happy with their creativity, and not deceived in their judgement. (*Inst*. 2.4.10–14)

With this advice, Quintilian offers wise guidance on age-appropriate constructive criticism. And What about punishments? It is striking that, apart from his criticism and rejection of corporal punishment (cf. §4), Quintilian does not devote any space to the subject of punishment. He prefers, he says, to admonish with moderate severity, which is logical in itself, since admonition is also a form of persuasion. Admonition should demand decency and integrity, and admonition should reject greed, misbehavior, or lack of restraint. According to Quintilian, the more often one admonishes, the less often it is necessary to punish. He says no more about this, and thus also refrains from explaining the nature of the punishments (*Inst*. 1.3.13; 2.2.5).

So much for Quintilian's pedagogical practice, although much more could be mentioned. For the purpose of this study, however, the examples given should suffice, as they adequately demonstrate what pedagogical action based on persuasion looks like in contrast to omnipresent coercion. Much of what he proposes may, from a modern-day perspective, be considered a matter of common sense, but from his point of view—and once again this should be borne in mind—it was not so at all. Nevertheless, a pedagogy based on love was and is attractive, and has prevailed over time. Of course, this is due not least to the older and better-known approach, that of Plato's pedagogical *eros*. Where do we stand today with regard to discourses on love in education?

6. Quintilian's *Amor* versus Plato's *Eros*

6.1 Humanistic Pedagogy

In the context of the so-called humanistic pedagogy that characterized the nineteenth century and the twentieth up to the 1960s, according to Magdalena Klinger, love in a purely spiritual-ideal sense was part of every teacher's professional self-image.[58]

58 Magdalena Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros: Erotik in Lehr-/Lernbeziehungen aus kontextanalytischer und ideengeschichtlicher Perspektive* (Berlin: Logos, 2011), 338.

6.2 Empirical Pedagogy

This changed, however, with the emergence of so-called empirical pedagogy from the 1960s onward, the background to which was the economic upswing of the post-war period.[59] The leading founder Heinrich Roth and the subsequent representatives of this empirical approach argued that humanistic pedagogy may have been useful for a school in the context of the educated classes of the nineteenth century, but that other needs had to be met for the highly industrialized economic system of the twentieth century, and that this had to be done with the help of more suitable means.[60] They therefore called for a "realistic turn" toward an output-oriented education system, one that would lead to a more efficient school system by means of empirical fact-finding, capable of supplying the growing needs of the economy with the necessary human capital.[61]

Empirical pedagogy was based on the belief that scientific and social progress could only be guaranteed through rationality and effectiveness. Human and personal-subjective imponderables, and in general all vague concepts that eluded empirical examination, such as pedagogical love, were to be excluded as far as possible as subjects of pedagogical research.[62]

In education theory, this view led to the suppression of human conditionalities, that is, to understanding in the context of individual, social, and historical conditions. This inevitably led to deficits that were recognized by the representatives of empirical pedagogy, as they became aware that content cannot be conveyed without personal mediation, that is, without a teacher-student relationship.[63]

However, with regard to this teacher-pupil relationship, a dilemma was identified in that, on the one hand, a teacher has to be committed to the principle of equal opportunity, which requires equal treatment of all pupils, but on the other hand, the teacher also has to differentiate and select his or her pupils according to their performance, which can only be achieved by ignoring the pupil as a holistic individual.[64]

Because of this action dilemma, within the framework of empirical pedagogy it was argued, that the attitude of a teacher requires professional distance within the framework of a professional pedagogical relationship. With this view of the teacher-pupil relationship as a professional learning relationship, empirical education theory reached its logical climax, namely the view that pedagogical action cannot be oriented toward the idea of pupils' empowerment and holistic personality development, but only toward what, according to the economic and business supply and demand model, appears to be useful and exploitable on the market of educational opportunities.[65]

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59 Magdalena Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 338.
60 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 340.
61 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 338.
62 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 345.
63 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 345–46.
64 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 346–47.
65 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 347–50.

6.3 Return of Love in Pedagogy

However, there was increasing criticism of the removal of the personal from the educational process in empirical pedagogy, and in a move away from what was perceived as "bourgeois coldness" in education, new pedagogical approaches brought the human factor back to the fore.[66] Some of these critics practiced compensatory rhetoric in the context of their new approaches, because what had previously been described as pedagogical love now appeared as care or caring, as empathy, alterity, responsibility, interaction or communication.[67]

Others, on the other hand, drew on the historical, that is, Platonic love discourse, so that today there is a coexistence between pedagogical *eros* and pedagogical love or pedagogical *agape*, which have either entered into direct competition with empirical pedagogy, or at least wish to complement it.[68] Since the 1990s, pedagogical *eros* has enjoyed particular popularity, thanks to an increased reception of Plato in the Anglo-American world, which suggested a new reception of the concept of *eros* and Socrates as the ideal type of teacher. In these writings, according to Klinger

> Eros is rediscovered, following Plato, above all as an educational principle for understanding democracy …, as it offers the opportunity to initiate holistic human education, among which the authors include emancipation and maturity of the individual, to be initiated in particular through irrational forces such as creativity, aesthetics and the creation of

66 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 351.

67 On care and caring, Nel Noddings has been particularly influential; see e.g., Nel Noddings, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); and Nel Noddings, *The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education*, 2nd ed., Advances in Contemporary Educational Thought 8 (New York: Teachers College Press, 2005). For the remainder, see Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 351–52.

68 For a selection of literature cited by Klinger, see *Pädagogischer Eros*, 352. For pedagogical *eros*, see, e.g., Daniel Patrick Liston and James W. Garrison, *Teaching, Learning, and Loving: Reclaiming Passion in Educational Practice* (New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2004); Reinhard Uhle, "Pädagogischer Eros und effektiver Unterricht," in *Liebe in Zeiten pädagogischer Professionalisierung*, ed. Elmar Drieschner and Detlef Gaus (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2011), 85–101, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92680-3_4; Rebecca Gudat, *Pädagogischer Eros und literarisierte Formen grenzüberschreitender Lehrer-Schüler-Beziehungen: Von Platon in die (Post-)Moderne*, Epistema 883 (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2017); Karsten Kenklies, "The Struggle to Love: Pedagogical Eros and the Gift of Transformation," *Journal of Philosophy of Education* 53 (2019): 547–59, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9752.12376; Noor E. Jannat, "Untangling Pedagogical Eros: Toward an Erotic Model of Education," *Educational Philosophy and Theory* (2021): 2043–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/00131857.2021.1977625; or Amia Srinivasan, *The Right to Sex* (London: Bloomsbury, 2021). For pedagogical love, see, e.g., Drieschner and Gaus, *Liebe in Zeiten pädagogischer Professionalisierung*; Nadja Köffler et al., eds., *Bildung und Liebe: Interdisziplinäre Perspektiven* (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2018); or Inge Eidsvåg, *Læreren: Betraktninger om Kjærlighetens Gjerninger* (Oslo: Cappelen Damm, 2018). For pedagigical *agape*, see e.g., Edward J. Birkenbeil, "Möglichkeit und Grenzen einer Begegnung zwischen dem seit den Griechen proklamierten 'pädagogischen Eros (ἔρως)' und der christlich motivierten 'pädagogischen Agape (ἀγάπη)': Versuch, Denkanstösse Edith Steins und Martin Bubers in die Diskussion um die Pädagogische Ethik aufzunehmen," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Pädagogik* 63 (1987): 307–18, https://doi.org/10.30965/25890581-06303003.

> a greater closeness to life between teacher and pupil in order to release the power of eros. Instead of fragmented scientific rationality, the aim is to achieve far-sighted and comprehensive wisdom education with the aim of "reawakening" an education based on values along the lines of ancient Eros .... Hence the demand: "Let us reawaken the ancient conversation about teaching the passions to desire the good. We need to talk about the education of Eros, the education for wisdom."[69]

6.4 Dangers of Love Discourses

However, historical hindsight shows that whenever love appeared in the concept of *eros* in the field of education, the teacher-pupil relationship came under scrutiny. This also affected a model educational institution in Germany, the Odenwaldschule in the federal state of Hesse, where systematic sexual abuse of pupils was uncovered in 2010, presumably due to its connection to the reform pedagogical approach. Klinger wrote her work *Pädagogischer Eros: Erotik in Lehr-/Lernbeziehungen aus kontext-analytischer und ideengeschichtlicher Perspektive* (2011) with this national scandal at the now closed school in mind. She is therefore more critical of love discourses within education than her American colleagues and, with her in-depth analysis, is an active participant in the new debate about closeness and distance within the educational relationship that has arisen in the wake of this scandal.[70]

Klinger explains the problem inherent in pedagogical *eros* as follows: Unleashed passion, as suggested by the term *eros*, has always been regarded as a threat to social order, which is why its taming has always been considered the primary task of civic order, ethics, and the art of living. Plato was also involved in this taming. Although he believed that he could not do without the aggressive, violent, and sexual potential inherent in *eros*, as he apparently only saw the creation of something new (be it a new man or a new just and good state) guaranteed through this concept of love, he pointed *eros* in other directions in the belief that he could tame it. He achieved this by linking *eros*'s desire for love with the knowledge of truth, thus assigning a new object to the desire for love.[71] By linking sexual desire with spiritual knowledge, however, Plato set acts of sexuality and knowledge in parallel, according to Klinger, which is why sexual union morphed into one of the most common metaphors for knowledge in Western history.[72]

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69 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 352–53 (author translation).

70 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 353.

71 This new object was, as we know, knowledge of the beautiful, the good, and the true, and ultimately the divine. In pedagogical *eros*, as Plato had largely conceived it in the *Symposium* and *Phaedrus*, the "seeing" of the beautiful in the well-formed boy's body of the beloved (the ἐρώμενος) would serve as the initial spark that would send the lover and educator (the ἐραστής)—triggered by the divine power—into a frenzy of love. This in turn would allow their souls to sprout wings, as Plato puts it figuratively in Phaedrus (*Phaedr*. 246d–e), and enable them to soar toward the goal, i.e., immortal ideas. According to Plato's conception, the vision of immutable ideas on the path of education, which had to be reached step by step and ultimately left physical union behind, was only open to the lover of wisdom, i.e., the philosopher (Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 3, 299–300).

72 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 369–70.

As is well known and as mentioned, however, sexual union was not the goal for Plato—and for those who misunderstood him in this regard, he was ready with criticism[73]—but merely an erotic step-by-step path to reach the highest asexual level, the vision of the divinely beautiful, good, and true, which is why, according to Klinger, Plato's philosophical revaluation of *eros*, indeed of love madness, came at the price of desexualization.[74]

It is precisely in this "educational myth," as Klinger calls Plato's concept, that she identifies three dangers that invite abuse:[75] First, that the actual superiority of the adult teacher (in physical, intellectual, and experiential terms) over the pupil, or in other words: the real relationship of power and dependency, is concealed and glossed over by means of a love metaphor. Second, this power relationship is reinforced in a special way, namely by the fact that teachers who love their pupils may believe themselves to be acting on behalf of a higher power (of truth, knowledge, or God), who through their educational work not only redeem pupils for their individual happiness, but at the same time aid society as a whole in achieving its salvation.[76] And finally, according to Klinger, the desexualization inherent in pedagogical *eros* was to be found in a series of socially relevant pedagogical love discourses, the aim of which was to tame *eros* and thus to steer the human sex drive into civilizationally and socially desirable paths by means of the educational process—that is, to societize people by means of such discourses of power, as Klinger calls them, with a renunciation of drive.[77]

Klinger also has little hope for new editions of love discourses. For by resorting to the overarching term "love," the sexually desirous and impetuous component of the original *eros* is merely linguistically suppressed and thus downplayed, which is often accompanied by the replacement of the object of love in line with a spiritualized sublimation.[78] According to Klinger, this is probably also the real problem of the entire historical discourse on love, because the pedagogical *eros* and its polished new editions semantically invoke not only Plato's erotic gradual path, but also the entire complex of ancient love for boys, which is why the concept of love used in the context of knowledge and education evokes sexual desire per se, that is, precisely what should actually be excluded from the context of the pedagogical concept of love. The concept of love in pedagogy is therefore of little help against sexual abuse of power, Klinger concludes, as it itself essentially shapes the character of the power relationship within the educational relationship.[79]

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73 Cf. Pausanias's speech in Plato, *Symp*. 180c–185e. Plato, *Lysis; Symposium; Phaedrus*, ed. and trans. Christopher Emlyn-Jones and William Preddy, LCL (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2022), 169–87.

74 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 369–70.

75 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 376.

76 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 375.

77 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 369.

78 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 369.

79 Klinger, *Pädagogischer Eros*, 370, 375–76.

6.5 Quintilian's Alternative

A look at the history of education theory and reality has made Klinger pessimistic about the discourse on love in education. That is understandable. However, she pays no attention to Quintilian, and this may be due to the fact that he was not primarily associated with pedagogical love. This makes a comparison of Quintilian's pedagogical love with Plato's pedagogical *eros* all the more worthwhile.

Section 4 showed that Quintilian also uses the metaphor of sexual union for the successful process of learning. Thus his conception of this process—like Plato's—has a trinitarian and generative character, consisting of a seed referring to the educational content, a teacher giving the seed, and a pupil receiving this seed, in whom knowledge grows through its reception. While Plato placed the main emphasis on the philosopher, and Hanna Arendt, with her postulated love of the world, placed weight on the doctrinal content, Quintilian clearly emphasized the student.[80]

Although terms such as *adfectus* and *amor* are used, Quintilian does not mean ἔρως or ἀγάπη, but from the four available Greek terms for love primarily στοργή, parental love (cf. *Inst*. 2.2.4; see §4), and at best also φιλία, amicable love (cf. *Inst*. 1.2.15; see §4).

In his sixth book, Quintilian specifies the emotions even further and speaks of two sets of feelings, namely "pathos" (πάθος) and "ethos" (ἦθος), which he characterizes in the awareness of their oppositeness, and assigns them—without judging them—different functions in the context of the epilogue of the court speech:

> However, as we learn from our ancient authorities, there are two kinds of emotions. One is called pathos by the Greeks, and we correctly and properly translate this as "emotion" [*adfectus*]. The second kind they call *ēthos*; in my view, Latin lacks any equivalent. People use *mores*, and the "ethical" division of philosophy is therefore called "moral." But looking at the nature of the thing, I think *ēthos* means not so much *mores* as a certain special aspect of mores, because *mores* itself covers all mental attitudes. More cautious writers have preferred to express the sense rather than translate the word. They have therefore spoken of one of the sets of emotions as violent, and the other as gentle and steady; in the one (they say) the passions are vehement, in the other subdued; the former command, the latter persuade [*persuadere*]; the former are powerful agents of disturbance, the latter of good will. Some say also that *ēthos* is permanent, pathos temporary. (*Inst*. 6.2.8–10)

Quintilian explains the nature of *ethos* in more detail with regard to persons close to one another as follows:

> I think I had better give a special explanation of the nature of *ēthos*, because the word itself does not seem to express the meaning clearly. The *ēthos* which I mean, and which I want to see in a speaker, will be that which is recommended primarily by goodness: not only mild and calm, but usually attractive and polite, and pleasing and delightful to the listeners. The

80 Hannah Arendt, "The Crisis in Education," in *Between Past and Future: Six Exercises in Political Thought* (New York: Viking, 1961), 173–96.

> great virtue [*virtus*] in expressing it lies in making it seem that everything flows from the nature of the facts and the persons, so that the speaker's character [*mores*] shines through his speech and is somehow recognized. It does of course occur most of all between persons closely connected with each other, whenever we put up with someone, forgive, apologize, or warn, with no trace of anger or hatred anywhere near. But the moderation [*moderatio*] shown by a father to his son, a guardian to his ward, or a husband to his wife is one thing (for these persons emphasize their affection for the very people who wrong them, and stir up ill feeling against them solely by being seen to love [*amare*] them). (*Inst*. 6.2.12–14)

Emotions in the sense of *ethos*, however, Quintilian links to the good nature of the rhetor:

> Finally, *ēthos* in all its forms requires a good and even-tempered person. Since the orator needs to demonstrate these qualities, if he can, in his client too, he must at any rate possess, or be thought to possess, them himself. He will thus do the best service to his Causes, as his own good character will lend them credibility. For the man who seems bad when he speaks must inevitably speak badly [for he does not seem to be saying what is just, and even if he did, it would not seem to be *ēthos*]. (*Inst*. 6.2.18)

Although Quintilian discusses the emotional set of *ethos* in the context of the court speech and its concluding section, it can be deduced from the above quotation that he assigns parental love—and thus implicitly also that of the teacher (cf. §4)—to *ethos*. Let us not forget that Quintilian had his beloved son in mind when he wrote the *Institutio*, which is why the paternal love he describes must arise a priori from the nature of a good father. However, a good father, like a good teacher, imposes limits on himself with regard to the power given to him, which becomes implicitly clear when Quintilian criticizes the obvious abuse of power by teachers toward their pupils: "It is enough to observe that no one ought to be allowed too much power over helpless and easily victimized young people" (*Inst*. 1.3.17). Furthermore, Quintilian's concept of love is also hierarchical, but unlike Plato's concept of erotic love, the hierarchy in the love between father and son cannot be concealed and must necessarily remain transparent. Furthermore, since we are dealing here with human love between people close to each other, Quintilian does not need to link it to metaphysics and thereby to exalt it. And finally, Quintilian's parental love cannot offer a hand to tame the sex drive, since, in his view, it lies entirely beyond this type of love.

However, Quintilian's love in the sense of *ethos* still offers scope for criticism—at least from today's perspective—for example, in that it was only directed at free, male individuals belonging to the elite.[81] It is also questionable in that his love assigned to

81 This does not mean that slaves did not receive an education. They did, in so-called παιδαγωγία, e.g., the most famous of which was the imperial court. See Hanne Sigismund-Nielsen, "Slave and Lower-Class Roman Children," in Grubbs and Parkin, *Oxford Handbook of Childhood and Education*, 296, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199781546.013.014. But the aim of their education was another, it was to make them "useful(er)" to their owners, which is why there were few professions in which slaves were not trained. Quintilian mentions slaves who worked as educators in private households (see ch. 4), but also ones who made themselves useful as teachers are attested. See Kelly

ethos cannot be metaphysically elevated, which, as mentioned above, has a positive aspect but also a negative one, namely that it has to adapt to worldly events, which in Rome were in turn mainly determined by elites. Quintilian's love discourse can therefore also be understood as a power discourse in a certain sense.

As a result of the above comparison, Quintilian's parental love seems to be better equipped against the abuse of power than Plato's pedagogical *eros*. With the necessary adaptations to today's circumstances, such as egalitarianism, for example, he shows a viable way in which love can be preserved in education in general and in the teacher-student relationship in particular. But what benefit does love serve in pedagogy as Quintilian describes it?

7. Quintilian's *Amor* in the Present

In the previous section (§6) it was shown that Quintilian assigns the love of parents for their children and that of teachers for their pupils to the emotional set of *ethos*. For him, this presupposes a good nature on the part of both parents and teachers. However, the good nature of teachers does not mean that good education has been achieved. A closer reading of a passage from his theory of emotions reveals that he can also draw an ethical benefit from love.

In the above quotation, Quintilian refers to the "articulation" of the feelings associated with *ethos*, that is, the action of speaking, as *virtus*, virtue, and the "moral attitude" of the orator, rhetorician, father or teacher as *mores*, ethics (*Inst*. 6.2.13). In order to understand how Quintilian links the feeling of love with ethics, let us take a closer look at the following verse:

> It does of course occur most of all between persons closely connected with each other, whenever we put up with someone, forgive, apologize, or warn, with no trace of anger or hatred anywhere near. But the moderation [*moderatio*] shown by a father to his son, a guardian to his ward, or a husband to his wife is one thing (for these persons emphasize their affection for the very people who wrong them, and stir up ill feeling against them solely by being seen to love [*amare*] them). (*Inst*. 6.2.14)

Those who love in the sense of *ethos*, says Quintilian, can respond differently, that is, more ethically, to those close to them—especially in situations of conflict. She or he can respond with moderation to behavior that would normally result in an affective response in the sense of *pathos*, such as anger or hatred. And this is because such love can opt for ethical action, for acceptance, forgiveness, satisfaction, or kind reminders.

L. Wrenhaven, "Slaves," in Bloomer, *Companion to Ancient Education*, 464–73, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119023913.ch32. Girls as well were able to obtain an education in Rome. Cf., e.g., Emily A. Hemelrijk, "The Education of Women in Ancient Rome," in Bloomer, *Companion to Ancient Education*, 292–304, https://doi.org/10.1002/9781119023913.ch32. Even female teachers are attested (Cribiore, *Gymnastics of the Mind*, 74–101). However, they were not to be found in schools such as those run by Quintilian, as the public sphere was not considered an acceptable place of activity for women.

It is this capacity for moderation in the face of misconduct that can be utilized in education. In other words, it enables *amor* to act more ethically in relationships, which includes relationships in an educational setting.[82]

In this approach, Quintilian is very modern, because he anticipates what today's philosophers—such as Martha C. Nussbaum in her work *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, published in 2001—have convincingly argued, namely that emotions do not belong in the realm of feelings (only), but (also) in the domain of values and moral judgments.[83]

Interest, seeing the learner, showing affection, loving them—even when being wronged—works, as empirical studies have shown, and as all those teachers who have witnessed the magic inherent in pedagogical *amor* know.[84] However, pedagogical *amor* cannot be completely scripted, rather it simply occurs, seemingly inexplicably. But anyone can prepare the way for this tried and tested value as far as possible and expect it in the here and now. This is precisely what Quintilian invited his readers to do. He still does.

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82 The idea that lovers want to live out a better version of themselves toward their loved ones is also familiar to Plato, who in his *Symposium* (178d) and in the words of Phaedrus links it with honor and shame.

83 Martha C. Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). Cf. also Richard A. Katula, "Quintilian on the Art of Emotional Appeal," *Rhetoric Review* 22 (2003): 5–15, esp. 6, https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327981RR2201_1. That Nussbaum's approach works has been plausibly argued by Michael Tetzer in relation to social pedagogy. See Tetzer, "Liebe und sozialpädagogische Professionalität: Reflexionen im Gegenlicht des emotionstheoretischen Ansatzes nach Martha Nussbaum," in Drieschner and Gaus, *Liebe in Zeiten pädagogischer Professionalisierung*, 179–207, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-92680-3_7.

84 See, e.g., the documentary series "#dusåmeg," by Gry Kårstad and Even Kjølleberg which was broadcast on NRK in 2017, and in the context of which five young people movingly thanked their teachers that they "were seen" by him or her during their time at school (https://tv.nrk.no/serie/dusaameg). I would like to dedicate this contribution to my primary school pupils in the district school TED in Diegten in 2016 (Switzerland), and to my students at Nord University (Campus Mo i Rana, Norway) in the academic year 2022/2023.

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