one

Introduction: Bridging Educational Virtues and Values

Kåre S. Fuglseth, Gabriella Gelardini, and Per Jarle Bekken

> The thing that hath been
> it is that which shall be
> and that which is done is that which shall be done
> and there is no new thing under the sun.
>
> Eccl 1:9 (KJV)

1. A Conversation about *Paideia* in Past and Present

"No new thing under the sun"? If the preacher in Ecclesiastes is right, we can actually learn from the past since the past always repeats itself.[1] In a modern and scientific age, this principle seems to be questionable, although some ancient practices, like war and autocracy, keep repeating themselves in the first part of the twenty-first century CE. Educational studies have a long tradition of querying the past for inspiration and examining preceding ideas. This is also the purpose of this book project and the preceding conference in Bodø, Norway (see acknowledgments). Looking primarily to (religious) texts of the Greco-Roman, Jewish, and early Christian eras, we aimed to discover, or perhaps rediscover, themes related to *paideia* or education in the broad sense in these ancient texts. The participants were asked to focus in particular on the themes of *virtues and values* in the past. In addition, their relevance for the present was also discussed. This thematic focus required interdisciplinarity, which is why we facilitated a conversation with main papers by scholars in different areas and studies of antiquity, along with responses by scholars from contemporary educational studies. In this introduction to the edited papers of the conference, we, the editors, wish to provide a brief overview of the book, including the main ideas behind the project, the issues it raises, and discussions it entails.

While much has been written about educational theories and practices in past times and about ethical matters generally, as well as about *paideia* in ancient Judaism and early Christianity, less attention has been devoted to the essential aspects of values, and values in relation to virtues.[2] This is somewhat surprising from a present point of

1 The editors are grateful to James Spinti for proofreading this chapter.

2 Close examples to our studies that are more thematically broad are Jason M. Zurawski and Gabriele Boccaccini, eds., *Second Temple Jewish "Paideia" in Context*, BZNW 228 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017); and Karina Hogan, Matthew Goff, and Emma Wasserman, eds., *Pedagogy in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*, AJL 41 (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017). For a more general approach about learning from the ancients for a meaningful life, one cannot avoid mentioning Pierre Hadot, *Exercises spirituels et philosophique antique*, new, expanded ed. (Paris: Albin Michel, 2002).

view, given that the transmission from one generation to the next of what we today call values (see the discussion of definitions of values in §2.2) has always played a fundamental role in education, from antiquity to the present, and particular their relation to *religion* in Greco-Roman, Jewish, and Christian writings. Are there ancient ideas, themes, discussion, or practices that resonate with contemporary challenges and problems? We followed a heuristic approach in this endeavor, not a systematic or complete search.

A reason for choosing value is that it has become a key concept in studies of moral philosophy and empirical studies of education today, at least in Western countries.[3] Using this concept and way of thinking and of judgment and practices that the word *value* entails is so well established that it seems to be taken for granted everywhere that moral issues are brought up for discussion in education and educational studies. One telling example is the efforts by the European Union to define "European values."[4] Scholars once again question mere instrumental approaches to teaching, arguing that value-based education is an end in itself.[5] Actually, at a closer look, in addition to being central to educational discussions today, topics connected to values are found throughout European history, and the acknowledgment of this fact forms the basis of our interest and motivation for this book project. Virtue, instead, has a longer history, as it is connected to the ancient discussion of the good life.[6] Virtue was added to our quest for value since these concepts are somewhat connected, but exactly how is not very clear. We believe there is still a need for clarification of the concept of value generally and for informing teachers today.[7] This book is an effort to fill this gap in the scholarly field.

More examples may demonstrate the core position of our themes in the present-day educational debate. In primary and lower secondary schools, "democracy and citizenship" is now being presented as an interdisciplinary topic through curriculum revisions in many countries in Europe. Teachers are told to encourage everyone to exercise their right to vote in elections because we value voter turnout. We want to protect freedom of expression because we value openness and the exchange of

3 The European qualification framework (EQF) does not mention the notion of value as such, but includes, e.g., responsibility and autonomy as one of the key categories at all eight levels, cf. https://europass.europa.eu/en/description-eight-eqf-levels. See examples further down.

4 Researchers engaged by the European Union have studied empirically social expressions "European values," see, e.g., the report and discussions by Regina Polak and Patrick Rohs, eds., *Values, Politics, Religion: The European Values Study; In-depth Analysis, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Future Prospects* (Cham: Springer Nature, 2023).

5 See Gert Biesta, "Why 'What Works' Still Won't Work: From Evidence-based Education to Value-based Education," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* (2010): 491–503, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9191-x; Biesta, "Taking the Angle of the Teacher," *Scottish Educational Review* (2023): 175–91, https://doi.org/10.1163/27730840-bja10014.

6 See, e.g., Tom Harrison and David Walker, *The Theory and Practice of Virtue Education* (Oxford: Routledge, 2018); Catherine A. Darnell and Kristján Kristjánsson, *Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice: Are Virtues Local or Universal?*, Routledge Research in Character and Virtue Education (Oxford: Routledge, 2021).

7 Polak discusses definitions of values and concludes that there is a "conceptual chaos in contemporary debates on value" (Polak and Rohs, *Values, Politics, Religion,* 54).

opinions. However, the ideals we have taken for granted for several years are under pressure. We live in a world that is polarized and there is an ongoing war in Eastern Europe. We see culture wars between the left and right wings in politics, accusing one another of being existential threats to fundamental values and themselves as defenders and guardians of these values. There are also several examples within the educational sphere that we can mention. In Norway, there was a long debate about the fundamental principles that Norwegian public education was supposed to stand for or represent: Were they Christian values? Were they secular? Were they neither or were they both?[8] It ended up being a version of both (see the contribution of Clemens Cavallin, ch. 15). We are aware of similar debates in the United States about critical race theory in schools. Regardless of one's position, it ends up as a debate about values. What values should the educational system represent? What we are perhaps seeing is not simply a conflict of different values but a confusion arising from our failure to properly think through what "values" are.

The role of religion has always been central for education. Considered a means of transmitting and negotiating values, education has long been tied up with religion. This is not as evident any longer in many places, but in fact is even more urgent today because our present-day social and political situation in Western countries, even among people that share basic liberal ideals, is nonetheless marked by unprecedented complexity and a constant pluralization of religious and secular worldviews in a global stream of information in both formal and informal channels. In addition, this situation challenges traditional confession-based religious and ethical education. These are aspects of education that the ENRECA series at Waxmann, Religious Diversity and Education in Europe*,* aims to deliberate: the crisis of knowledge and democracy gives further prominence to the multicultural riddle of religious education in a broad sense. The series, corresponding to our efforts, takes as a point of departure the globalization and pluralistic situations that influence all areas of education, including religious education. The ENRECA series aims to lay the groundwork for a discussion of whether the intercultural and multireligious situation in Europe demands a reevaluation of the existing educational systems. There are similarities between the ancient and the modern at this point, since the ancient Greco-Roman world was also multireligious and different solutions were competing in several ways, at least in the pre-Constantine era.

In our attempt to bridge this chasm, we have engaged scholars within several historical areas that do not normally meet in a conversation around these educational themes. We have tried to look beyond the specific literary-historical context, drawing conceptual and comparative connections to ancient and current themes of education. The more specific results, or the essential insights from the debate that the chapters introduce, are briefly noted in §3, below. Each contribution is here commented upon by the editors in light of the overall question: Can we learn from these ancient texts? And, if so, What can we learn from them? Our historical approach to discovering

8 Cf. the Norwegian "Core Curriculum: Values and Principles for Primary and Secondary Education," https://www.udir.no/lk20/overordnet-del/?lang=eng.

ideas that we might find relevant to discuss today depends on certain methodological considerations that are presented in §2 below. Exploration is of course fine as a scholarly approach or attitude, but in the end, one should also come to some conclusions. Therefore, in §4 we will sum up some results and general insights that have come out of these explorations. Is there anything new at all or is it basically variants of the same old educational questions, as the preacher claimed (Eccl 1:9)?

2. On the Possibility of Bridging in These Matters

2.1. Continuities and Discontinuities

Learning from past experience is in one respect the only possible way for contemporary education to help the next generations be prepared for their unknown future. From what else can we learn if not from our past experience? Learning from the past is therefore possible, but methodologically more challenging than mere historiography. Some theories and practices from the past have only historical value, but we cannot know for sure beforehand. At this point, modern scholarship seems to differ from the Preacher in Ecclesiastes. Other past social issues look initially more relevant for the present understanding, for example, the origin of present-day institutions, expressions, metaphors, ideas, collective habits, or traditions. They come in texts and social traditions with a long history and where the origin and early development are probably important for our present understanding.

Initially, there are many clues to the importance of the past in educational studies today.[9] All the main religious traditions present in the West, that is, the Abrahamic traditions (Christian, Jewish, or Islamic), depend on the idea that essential insights come from the past, and from antiquity in particular. For them studying the past for present purposes is a constant, almost daily activity. Similarly, learning from the past is central in many cultural areas. The Western history of philosophy and ideas teaches us that ancient ideas are still alive and that "learning from" is too weak a term. The Greek philosophers, particularly Aristotle, invented theorizing by developing perspectives and ideas, along with a terminology that we use in all modern, scholarly works. This is seen most clearly in the discussion of knowledge, judgment, and action theory, the principal themes of educational theory and practice. Epistemology, ontology, and methodology represent ancient Greek inventions that *form* the way we think, value, and act. Thus, in human studies, the historical study of the origins of thought always seems to be relevant and worthy of scrutiny. In theology, taken broadly, that is, as the study of belief in God or transcendent power(s), political theory on republics and democracies, and in studies of education in general, knowledge of past ideas is still with us, whether we are aware of it or not. For several modern ideas, the roots go back to antiquity. For instance, Adela Yarbro Collins (ch. 39) discusses how ethical theories in Pauline letters echo modern ethical theories. Ignorance of the past in these

9 The scholarly discussion on the possibility to learn from or "use" the past has turned into a field of its own; cf. Roman Krznaric, *History for Tomorrow: Inspiration from the Past for the Future of Humanity* (London: Penguin, 2024).

matters is a hazardous attitude. Notably, some practices of education have a long history and therefore bridge themselves through generations. As Julia Ipgrave notes (ch. 9), some old methods of teaching and learning never disappeared. We can follow the lines: the Roman world did not end with the Roman period.

Scholars in the Renaissance and Enlightenment also looked to the ancient past for lessons and started the modern journey that continues today. However, there are also obvious differences between modern and premodern cultures, issues that contributions in this volume also mention and that may raise suspicion about the possibility of learning anything of present significance. Scholars may bring into question these ancient models. Steve Mason (ch. 29) points to several of these differences: the grasp of science and medicine; their views of slavery, women, and children; and judicial punishment. Our own experiences are necessary prejudices in studying the past, as Hans-Georg Gadamer noted.[10] We can judge the past, for example, their practice of slavery and compare it to modern slavery, as Meira Polliack writes (ch. 12).

Modern scholarly fields, including biblical studies and social anthropology, have developed robust frameworks for learning from the past in ways that are both transformative and corrective. In biblical studies, attempts have been made to use social anthropological methods to depict the societies in the Bible in order to facilitate our understanding of its cultures and what these texts entail. John J. Collins (ch. 16) explains, for example, how the ideas of universal human rights and duties they entail are *indirectly* connected to ideas in the Bible. The past or our study of it can adjust or correct us, which again is a challenge to the literal use of holy Scriptures and other texts that are looked upon as authoritative. Collins argues that the virtues presented in the Hebrew and Christian Bible must be evaluated from our point of view and that the idea and articulations of these rights may also adjust or at least problematize human rights concepts.

Insights from modern social anthropology have also revealed how premodern Mediterranean mentalities blur our sight on several issues in the Bible. Most of these social patterns are typical of all premodern and traditional societies even today, making it possible for us to understand them and their impact. Bruce J. Malina suggested five figures that are difficult to understand for modern minds: (1) the patriarchal family system, (2) the feeling of shame and honor, (3) the nonindividualist or dyadic mindset, (4) the idea that there are limited resources, and (5) the sociocultural system of the patron-client relationship.[11] Sociologists of religion have also pointed to the consequences of secularization that we must be aware of when we study premodern

10 Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, 4th ed. (Tübingen: Mohr, 1975).

11 Malina, *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology* (Atlanta: John Knox, 1981). The figures in more detail: (1) Patriarchal family system: this is a tribal and family-based society in which the husband and father are the superior authority. (2) Shame and honor or feelings of shame and honor: these are social perceptions that are far more important in this culture than for us, but we have these kinds of concepts as well. (3) Nonindividualism: we find a so-called dyadic system that all perceive themselves as dependent on each other. Individualism came with the modern society. (4) Limited resources: resources are limited, not created. In the capitalist world, one believes that value can be created from nothing, and in any case does not imply that we steal from others while doing

societies through their texts and artifacts. Peter Berger, for instance, noted how the formerly obvious place of religions as collective entities is undermined by pluralism. Religion has become voluntary; it is a matter of choice. There are secular spaces constantly created by modern technology that motivate further secularization.[12] There are some basic differences between premodern and modern perceptions in all these areas, and religious and value education is no exception. This is not the place to discuss these issues further; we mention them only to remind us of all of the difficulties involved and that understanding requires awareness and respect for difference.

The organizers and editors of this volume believe that in order to understand the horizons of choice that former humans encountered in their time, the teaching of all topics in school should not only be topical but also historical. This is one way to argue for the necessity of history as a school subject and as an aspect of all subjects. Not only does history provide perspective, but it also widens horizons and thus helps us understand every topic. This is also the case because, as the Jewish philosopher and political theorist Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) once argued, education of the next generations must start with a presentation of the past. Past examples of present-day types of problems are more suitable than present examples because the aim of schools is not to give children responsibility to solve the issues raised from the current situations; rather, teachers should enable students to take responsibility more generally.[13] We do not know what our children will truly need to know and handle in the future, but we know the near past relatively well and we know much about antiquity and the Greco-Roman world and believe we should prepare the next generation for their problems by teaching on that basis also.

2.2. Virtues versus Values

To discuss possible connections and being able to learn from the past, we need to determine our use of some of the core notions more precisely. Are similarities and differences with the past also obvious in regard to values and virtues, *paideia* or *Bildung* or do these issues make our kind of bridging difficult?

Virtue seems to be a relatively easier task to define than value. As a central concept in philosophy and religion, virtue has a well-established and deeply developed definition. As with the focus on bridge building, virtue ethics has gained a new renaissance in the study of ethical questions, and in particular, the Aristotelian ethical or practical (phronetic) knowledge has gained a central position of particular interest

---

it. (5) Patron-client: the system where a socially well-to-do person was a support or benefactor for a number of others.

12 See Berger, *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age* (Boston: de Gruyter, 2014); Berger and Samuel P. Huntington, *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

13 See Arendt, *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* (Middlesex: Penguin, 2006). See the discussion by Kåre S. Fuglseth, "Between Past and Future in Religious Education: The Categorical Answer," in *Religious Education on the Move: Challenging the Unknown Future of Religious Education*, ed. Ina Ter Avest et al., Religious Diversity and Education in Europe 41 (Münster: Waxmann, 2020), 209–22.

over the last fifty years, not only in ethical matters but also in action theory more generally.[14] Value, however, is much more difficult to determine. In ancient Greco-Roman, Jewish, and Christian literature, we find extensive discussions as to desired and appropriate virtues, but What is this thing we call values? We ran into a problem at this point when we were discussing the current Latin translation of the main theme of the conference. “Virtue and value” then became “*virtus et humanitas*.” Virtue is a good translation of *virtus*, and while *humanitas* is not truly similar to value, it does entail certain virtues or values in order to be complete.

As mentioned above, the notion of value is something very ubiquitous in our contemporary discourses. The *language of value* is something that we are very comfortable with. We talk about values all the time. Everything can have or be given value by some and deemed negative by others.[15] Not only in education but also in society generally, we seem to always be talking about the way in which positive values are under threat. Values are often understood as general guidelines for the execution of a good life, which then take shape in guidelines or certain norms. In turn, these norms shape and support the relationship one has not only with oneself but also with one’s fellow human beings and even with god or the gods. Values are said to hold societies and epochs together, but they are also culturally and contextually bound and constructed, as is the case with the European values (cf. above, §1).

As Hans Joas and several other scholars argue, the language of value truly did not come into moral discourse in any sort of systematic way until the nineteenth century.[16] First Karl Marx, but later also Friedrich Nietzsche, uses the term *value* very specifically in his discussion of ethics and morals. He seems to be at least inspired in some ways, perhaps, by the discussion of value in Adam Smith, who, in the economic space, had moved away from a premodern understanding of value as something intrinsic to things like gold and silver, or whatever it might be, and rather as something that is a product of market forces. Virtues are very much connected with the idea of the good life and even an objective good life, which is somehow preexisting, and then virtue is a way in which I bring myself into coherence with that. In contrast, values seem to point in a different direction. It is a different paradigm.[17]

One should try to be more precise in terms of where values are obtained. Both values and virtues are perhaps best understood as *aspects* of actions, practice-based,

---

14 See Richard Kraut, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics*, Blackwell Guide to Great Works (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006).

15 For a general discussion of value theory, see Mark Schroeder, “Value Theory,” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman (Stanford: Stanford University, 2024), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/value-theory/.

16 Cf. Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte*, Suhrkam Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1416 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999); See also the thorough treatment of the matter in James G. Hart and Lester Embree, eds., *Phenomenology of Values and Valuing*, Contributions to Phenomenology 28 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1997).

17 Cf. also James McGuirk, “Perspectives on Democracy, Citizenship and Value Education in the Norwegian School,” in *Education in Europe: Contemporary Approaches across the Continent*, ed. Tom Feldges, Routledge Education Studies (London: Routledge, 2023), 57–67, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003223528-7.

referring to phenomena that are dependent parts, not unlike color in relation to a physical object, like a tree, or perhaps as a background phenomenon. In the end, it can be argued that we can only understand values in the moral sense and virtues as dependent on an embodied practice and then initially understood only in practice and articulated narratively as examples, as Meira Polliack (ch. 12) and Kåre S. Fuglseth argue (ch. 4). Something may be *given* value, while moral values seem to have value in themselves; they demand something of us in practical life, like altruism. Money can thus be said to be given a value, whereas the love of neighbor *is* a value. At the least there is an essential difference here.[18]

On the other hand, virtue also runs into the difficulties seen above from the fact that the language of *virtue* has fallen out of contemporary discourse in society generally, and even within education. For most of the history of philosophy, virtue was a key term in the discussion of moral experience, given a primary place, but value was not. Ivar Asheim (1927–2020), the Norwegian moral and educational theorist, also noted that almost everything is seen as a question of value realization today and that "attitude" in many ways has replaced virtue. He argued, rightly, we believe, that it also applies to the ethical aspects of a situation, where ethical views are treated as value views and ethics are perceived as preserving values. It is assumed that there is a special category of values, moral values, which is the special task of ethics to assert, but that ethics must also be related to value realization in general.[19] The discussions in this book must further be viewed as an attempt to clarify these questions of value as a theoretical phenomenon.

2.3 *Paideia* or *Bildung*

The invited authors write about the role of education in cultivating and passing on virtues and values both in the ancient Mediterranean world at the turn of the Common Era and today. The authors engaged in this conversation in education by connecting it to broad ideas in liberal arts and the development of civilization in ancient times, *paideia*, as Werner Jaeger explained it.[20] The notion of *Bildung* or the formation of students to become independent and responsible individually and collectively is very close to *paideia*.[21] There is a scholarly and educational tradition found mostly

18 Cf. Joas, *Die Entstehung der Werte*.

19 Asheim, *Hva betyr holdninger? Studier i dydsetikk* [ET: *What Do Attitudes Refer to? Studies in Virtue Ethics*] (Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997).

20 The systematic study of Greek and early Christian *paideia* goes back to his thorough investigations in three volumes. See Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 1: *Archaic Greece, the Mind of Athens* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939); Jaeger, *The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 2: *In Search of the Divine Centre* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943; Jaeger, *The Ideals of Greek Culture*, vol. 3: *The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1944). A Norwegian example of the combination is Øivind Andersen, ed., *Dannelse, humanitas, paideia* [ET: *Bildung, Humanitas and Paideia*] (Oslo: Sypress, 1999).

21 In Greek literature in antiquity, *paideia* referred to the rearing of a child (Aeschylus) or to training and teaching, education in general (Aristotle, Thucydides et al.) and also to its result, culture, learning, accomplishments (Plato); see Henry Georg Liddell et al., *A Greek–English Lexicon* (Oxford: Claren-

in Northern Europe of *paideia* as *Bildung* in German and *danning* in Norwegian, literally translated as *forming*. Forming refers not only to the need for teachers or parents to form children, but also to be cautious while teaching and instructing, since it is necessary for everyone to form oneself to become responsible and autonomous, to use the phrasing of the European qualification framework (see above). This is what pedagogy and didactics is all about, and it is slightly different from the curriculum-thinking in Anglo-American schools.[22] As Malte Brinkmann notes (ch. 2), *paideia* is a concept that has been given different frames throughout history but is always connected to transformation, not just formation or education. *Bildung* is an experiential process dominated by negative experiences, he argues; it is becoming someone else. *Bildung* implies an ethos *for* the world and an ethos *toward* the world. Distinguishing these aspects brings antiquity back to us after a period of strong beliefs in the evidence-based and empiricist research in educational scholarship and challenges the purely instrumental purposes and liberal-market ideology for schooling in general, he claims.

Following up on Brinkmann's ideas, one may argue that empirical studies concerning education practices cannot be undertaken properly without a solid theoretical basis in pedagogical investigations. This is where the present studies and general approach used here may prove its main value.

3. Some Specific Bridges from the Present to the Past

3.1. Introduction to the Procedure

Our conference included three types of papers, main papers followed by prepared responses, short papers without responses, and public papers directed at the general public. In this volume they turn up as chapters of different character and length and for easy reference are organized along scholarly disciplines. Some of these disciplines have generated more contributions than other areas due to an open call for the short papers, which is why the different parts vary in length. Moreover, the scholars researching antiquity presented their topics on virtues and values and the ones occupied with the contemporary were asked to respond to or engage with the main paper and bridge the insights into educational science. Papers without responders (short and public papers) at the conference have included their own bridging.

All theories and practices in relation to ancient *paideia* seem to have some relevance today, either positively or negatively, apart from the idea of pedagogy as basically the only way to enhance responsibility and autonomy among students and

---

don, 1940), s.v. παιδεία. For a definition and history of *Bildung*, see Andreas Dörpinghaus, Andreas Poenitsch, and Lothar Wigger, *Einführung in die Theorie der Bildung* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006); Klaus Prange, "'Bildung': A Paradigm Regained?," *European Educational Research Journal* (2004): 501–9, https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2004.3.2.5.

22 For a comparison of the *Bildung/danning* tradition and the curriculum tradition in education, see Stefan Hopmann, "Restrained Teaching: The Common Core of Didaktik," *European Educational Research Journal* (2007): 109–24, https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2007.6.2.109.

ourselves as lifelong ventures. For the sake of a more systematic approach, at the conference in Bodø each contribution was divided into a section of subjects, and in the present volume, we followed the same procedure with nine sections: studies of educational theory or *Bildung* generally; texts from ancient Greece, Rome, Hebrew Bible, Deuterocanonical, Pseudepigraphal, and Apocryphal works, Philo of Alexandria, Flavius Josephus, and New Testament; and finally, two studies related to themes connected to specific present challenges in teaching. It is not difficult to notice the importance of these discussions for today, as we will try to demonstrate.

Naturally, some of them resonate more with our time than others. The contributions discuss virtues and values, and the methods of teaching and learning connected to these, such as manliness, the invention of virtue, philanthropy, the necessity of examples, the place of fear of God or gods, perfection, the character and place of knowledge in gaining virtue and realizing values, maternal instruction, serenity, thinking big, faithfulness, happiness or εὐδαιμονία, necessary educational institutions, models of virtues, sustainability, and the place of hesitation or reflection. The list is long; there are several possible connection points or bridges here. The responders to the main papers were given the task of discovering bridges. We believe that together, the main papers, responses, and short papers demonstrate a richness of readings and interpretations.

The editors here offer the readers of the book summaries and our understanding of the role of the chapters in the overall discussion. Readers are invited to study each contribution for themselves to clarify and perhaps identify other themes that escaped our attention. Through exploring the topic from various angles, together these contributions demonstrate that foundational concepts in *paideia* and *Bildung*, basic liberal values, such as human rights, are historically *contingent*, but their relevance to modern education is no less relevant. At the end of the introduction, we will point out some core insights from the whole book for the present-day educational discussion.

3.2. General Educational Theories

Insights from educational science concerning the idea of *Bildung* and *paideia* as a kind of liberal arts education have already been mentioned above. There are three contributions in this volume that belong to this more general idea of *paideia* or *Bildung* and *danning* today. The notion of education may be defined in this same fashion, but in English curriculum-based education or liberal arts formation might be alternatives.

As mentioned, Malte Brinkmann (ch. 2) argues that *Bildung,* as an experiential process, is dominated by negative experiences, that is, becoming someone else.

In his response to this view of *Bildung* as essentially a negative experience, James McGuirk (ch. 3) supports the idea that value experience amounts to revelations of the world that draw us into spaces in which the self's possibilities can unfold. However, the self-transformation of *Bildung* is more properly understood in response to the revelation of positive value, he argues. On the general level, this discussion is vital to our understanding of the teaching of values.

Kåre S. Fuglseth (ch. 4) points to the core place of what phenomenological literature calls step-by-step (polythetic) grasps in understanding abstract concepts such as values and virtues, that is, they refer to aspects of practices, not the action itself. He highlights the necessary place of interpretation and exploration for a deeper understanding of moral values. Against this philosophical theory, one can understand why narratives and examples are so essential in all the teaching and learning of values and virtues. Teachers must give examples and *themselves* be examples to help children establish virtues that can be materialized as values, he argues.

3.3. Ancient Greek Literature

Ancient Greek literature is a corpus of texts that has been extensively mined for educational insights, such as by Jaeger mentioned above (§2.3). In our book, the old question of whether virtues van be learned is brought forward in two contributions.

Tim Whitmarsh (ch. 5) refers to the Athenian discussion on virtue as a quality that could be acquired through training. He presents an early Athenian academic institution that stood in calculated opposition to mainstream Athens's own ideology, which treated virtue as a part of what was natural to the "nobility." Virtue was seen as heritable, and they attributed it only to "pure-born" Athenian citizens.

Jan Selmer Methi (ch. 6), in response to Whitmarsh, sees clear parallels to these pedagogical ideas in the Russian school of social and cultural conditions of education and activity theory in general in the twentieth century. All people can learn well under the right sociocultural conditions and with a good teacher. A similar discussion is also found in Daniel R. Schwartz's discussion of the virtue of high-mindedness that Josephus presents as something given by birth (see §3.8 on our comments regarding the discussion of virtues and values in Josephus's text).

3.4. Ancient Roman Literature

The studies on Roman literature offer five contributions: the place of philanthropy (Berthelot), the need for pedagogical love (Gelardini), methods of learning through the use of maxims or *sententiae* (short expressions of wisdom that can be explicated and explored; Rüpke and Ipgrave), and the purpose of education (Stock).

Katell Berthelot (ch. 7) notes that the ethical ideal of philanthropy and the virtue of benevolence toward fellow human beings are closely linked to the project of education. This is no less true for any kind of teaching and learning, including the idea of *paideia* today.

According to Jörg Rüpke (ch. 8), we can learn today from the maxims published by Publilius Syrus. These maxims are not only cynical commentaries on contemporary society, but also proposals of a multifaceted value of "urbanity." Rüpke thinks this is worth discussing in light of the contemporary challenges of how to live together in an age of planetary urbanization, for example, when reading the maxim that, "the greedy spirit cannot be satiated by any profit."

In her response to Rüpke, Julia Ipgrave (ch. 9) highlights another interesting historical link in the use of maxims by examining the grammar school model. In fact,

there is a direct dependency of Shakespearean modes of writing on the classical tradition of moral training through *sententiae* that Publilius represents. In this school model, there are two directional processes in the employment and formulation of aphorisms. Ipgrave points out how the condensation of claims and experiences in *sententiae* was to be combined in schools by expanding and recontextualizing them.

Gabriella Gelardini (ch. 10) picks up a central pedagogical treatise in the Roman world, Quintilian's acclaimed *Institutio oratoria*, and focuses on the generally overlooked but central topic of pedagogical love (*amor*). In connection with more recent approaches, such as Martha C. Nussbaum's *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, that position emotions not only in the realm of feelings, but also in the realm of values, moral judgments, and motivations, she demonstrates the usefulness of pedagogical love in today's educational life.[23]

Wiebke-Marie Stock (ch. 11) refers to the well-known thesis that the founder of Neoplatonism, Plotinus, does not have a primary focus on education. Nevertheless, he gives his readers some clues in that direction. Plotinus claimed that education should have a narrow or inward focus and not be understood as a way to achieve political goals in general. She points out how pedagogic activities do not seem to affect the common good. She argues that a persistent conundrum and legacy of ancient education and its revivers is seen in the tension between the potential civic *purpose of education* and the private, internal self-transformation of philosophically directed education. This is also a lesson for the present.

3.5. Hebrew Bible Literature

With nine contributions on the Hebrew Bible we move to other kinds of educational wisdom that might appear to be less relevant today. Nevertheless, these also resonate well with contemporary views on value education and critical remarks: the place of narratives as examples for understanding (Polliack and Skeie), the place and our understanding of belief in God for value education, a discussion that is still ongoing (Uusimäki, Cavallin, and Hall), the essential discussion of the origin of human rights in the Bible and whether teaching based on the biblical text can also promote ideas of human rights (John J. Collins). The section also presents the use of memory techniques (Lorenzen), though challenged today with the introduction of digital-based information from global computer networks. There are also contributions pointing to a more pessimistic tone for *paideia* and even warnings against it (Adam and Samuel L. Adams).

Meira Polliack (ch. 12) argues that we do learn ethics through stories, even from flawed biblical characters. She argues that the premodern Jewish exegetes in medieval times operated in a mixed cultural and political environment in which Jews, Christians, and Muslims engaged in explicating the multifaceted motivations of common heroes that informed their rival scriptures. It is possible that this process encour-

23 Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

aged them to spotlight stories on fragile individuals as a medium for ethical thinking in the biblical text and thus uncover biblical concerns that, for modern readers, have long since receded into the background.

In his response to Polliack, Geir Skeie (ch. 13) argues that the hermeneutical surplus in narratives is also inspirational for postmodern *paideia*. He sees several possible uses of this idea; for instance, narratives of flawed characters present dilemmas, and only by acknowledging their complexity can educational and ethical value be realized. He sees parallels to debates over educational policies, discussions about the purpose of education, and even the role of teachers in educational processes. Ancient narratives from the Bible (Hebrew, Old Testament) may play a key role when *paideia* is accepted as part of modern education.

Elisa Uusimäki (ch. 14) highlights another interesting biblical phenomenon: the fear of God and its pedagogical consequences. Historically, fear of God can be seen as a virtue, as a good quality of character to be cultivated. It is associated with morality and assumed to have *prosocial* implications, but its flavor is also epistemic in certain texts of the Hebrew Bible. In the Bible itself it is seen as a universal and cross-cultural dimension—and it is an issue still discussed today.

In his response to Uusimäki, Clemens Cavallin (ch. 15) notes that fear in general is *not* normally used in passages proclaiming fundamental values in schools. If fear of God is a prosocial virtue, it is time to include it in the general discussion of education. Cavallin sees a parallel in the connection suggested by Thomas Aquinas between love and fear and Thomas's understanding of the fear of God as a gift. This discussion is also an even more general one on the relationship between the universality and particularity of moral norms, values, and virtues. He argues that the main contribution of the concept of the fear of God in the context of education today is to highlight the importance and strength of love in relation to what has objective value. This is not emphasized in the juridical language of human rights or ideas of cultural heritage.

John J. Collins (ch. 16) contends in his chapter that there are some connections between the Bible and human rights, as we find in the Bible a concern for the weaker members of society, grounded in common humanity. The Bible may be said to contain some of the seeds of the modern idea of human rights. The fundamental orientation in human rights is in fact anthropocentric, not theocentric, as in the Bible, and in the Bible, morality is given from above, whereas in human rights, it is conceived as a response to human needs and desires. At some points, biblical demands may even challenge human rights.

With Søren Lorenzen's contribution (ch. 17), we return to educational methods. He argues that there are traces of memory techniques within the Hebrew Bible text. The speech of Moses in Deut 5–11 seems to follow the method of *loci*, and the key is the metaphor of walking on the path of YHWH. The loci, that is, the events and places of the exodus, help younger generations remember YHWH and his commandments.

Moritz F. Adam (ch. 18) presents doubts about the possibility of *paideia* in general that are found in wisdom literature. There are challenges connected to conditions of character formation and therefore also to *paideia* more broadly. He argues that Ecclesiastes provides a *Zeitkritik* against an optimistic trend so typical of wisdom

literature: there are difficulties with true knowledge generally, a fact that relativizes the theoretical basis that earlier literature took for granted.

The pedagogical use of adultery in Second Temple instructions is discussed by Samuel L. Adams (ch. 19). He argues that Prov 1–9, Sirach, and Wisdom of Solomon warn that infidelity results in a loss of reputation and shame. There is androcentric content on adultery that is concerned primarily with household stability in a patrilineal or patrilocal system. These texts illustrate the inherent difficulty in developing a virtue concept from ancient texts, including the Bible.

Robert G. Hall (ch. 20) demonstrates how the ideal of "reaching for divine thought" is one value of ancient Mediterranean *paideia*. Ancient authors, such as Plutarch in *On Isis and Osiris,* offer this value to readers in order to gain insight. The idea is that human knowing is prone to delusion, while the gods contemplate reality and truth, so the knowledge of human beings is best seen as sharing divine knowledge. Gods willingly share, but since the truth exceeds human capacity, they teach by signs that are windows on truth and human minds must study these signs to glimpse the truth, he claims.

3.6. Deuterocanonical, Pseudepigraphical, and Apocryphal Literature

The deuterocanonical, pseudepigraphical, and apocryphal literature may also be linked to contemporary discussions in education, here elaborated in three contributions. One of the contributions discusses a core educational *paideia*-issue: what it means to be human through virtue and perfection with a divine model, the *imitatio Dei* (Najman and Wright). The Greek word for virtue (ἀρετή) also refers to excellence. A central discussion even today is the place of the home and social ethics, with the role of mothers in particular, as arena for education of wisdom (Hogan and Sporre).

Hindy Najman and Benjamin G. Wright III (ch. 21) present a study of three different texts, the Wisdom of Ben Sira, the Hymn to the Creator, and the Hodayot, and they describe how the authors of these texts have employed discourses about virtue and perfection to construct what it means to be human. They note how these texts acknowledge that the human-divine divide cannot be completely overcome, but that the creation of humans in the image of God endows them with the possibility of imitating God, the *imitatio Dei*.

Maternal instruction in Proverbs and in the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha is examined by Karina Martin Hogan (ch. 22). She argues that mothers are frequently associated in this literature with both the process of moral formation and its results, virtue, for example, usually framed in terms of adherence to torah, and wisdom or understanding.

In her response to Hogan, Karin Sporre (ch. 23) discusses what one today may call a "childist" ethics. She argues that this kind of ethical thinking today is parallel to critical perspectives raised within social ethics, for example, by groups of women, people of color, or in today's decolonizing debates. This "childism" is seen in care of water and care for human beings, and their rights are virtues expressed in the interviews, as well as how the children articulate the survival of planet Earth and its inhabitants as crucial values.

3.7. Texts from Philo of Alexandria

The Jewish-Greek world of Philo of Alexandria, here analyzed in five contributions, may be seen as an early merge of Greek philosophy, Roman state ideology, as well as of biblical images and practices that became typical for the developments within the church fathers and theology during the Constantinian period. For that reason, he is more than interesting in this connection. Philo also demonstrates a combination in education of religion and philosophy, of Jewish prayer houses (synagogues) and Greek encyclical education in his hometown of Alexandria (Koskenniemi and Hezser). The way Philo thinks of biblical models for virtues for everyone (Bekken and Sterling) is also interesting from a modern point of view, not least in the combination of craft and virtue and the origin of these (Sean A. Adams).

Erkki Koskenniemi (ch. 24) discusses the place of educational institutions in Alexandria at the turn of the Common Era. He demonstrates that good education was greatly appreciated in the Hellenistic period. The main task of a gymnasium in the Hellenistic era was to train an *ephebe (*ἔφηβος), a citizen *in spe.* The texts of Philo present his ideals clearly, and these might help us reconstruct what education was like among the Jews, especially in the synagogues, the "places of instruction," or other social spaces.

In her response to Koskenniemi, Catherine Hezser (ch. 25) argues that Philo's own tricultural education must be considered exceptional. Nevertheless, educational opportunities outside of the home seem to have increased when Palestinian synagogues became centers of local communities.

Per Jarle Bekken (ch. 26) presents Philo's view on Abraham as a model for instruction and virtue in Jewish *paideia*. His study indicates that Philo's approach was marked by a view of the possibility for everyone to obtain virtue: *anyone* can emulate Abraham as a model of being "self-taught." The written laws of Moses reflect, reproduce, and replicate Abraham's virtues in harmony with unwritten laws in nature. Abraham, as the founding ancestor of the Jewish nation and forerunner of proselytes, was a paradigmatic figure of identification for "the study of the philosophy of the fathers" and the acquisition of virtues, which takes place each Sabbath in the synagogues. This kind of acceptive approach to the learning of virtues and his opening up for non-Jews or proselytes to the Jewish faith, resembles the view of several Greek philosophers that virtue can be learned by anyone. All differences apart, the contribution by Whitmarsh (ch. 5) also describes an open approach to education in Athens by noncitizens, and Methi (ch. 6) finds parallels to contemporary discussion today on learning as "natural."

In his response to Bekken, Gregory E. Sterling (ch. 27) comments on the rationale that Philo had for considering Abraham as a model for acquiring virtue by teaching. However, rather than situating Philo's role as an instructor in a house of prayer or synagogue, it is more helpful to locate him in a private school, similar to the schools of philosophers, Sterling argues.

Sean A. Adams (ch. 28) discusses the relationship of skillful craft (τέχνη) and virtue (ἀρετή) in Philo of Alexandria and its importance in the education process and compares it with similar discussions in antiquity. He identifies important differences,

especially Philo's emphasis on Scripture and the models provided therein, such as Moses, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, and the origin of both τέχνη and ἀρετή in the divine.

3.8. Texts from Flavius Josephus

One of Philo's near contemporaries in the first century, the Jewish historian in Rome, Flavius Josephus, can also teach us lessons, which are discussed in six contributions, perhaps even values that one deems negative for general education, such as masculine toughness and severity (Mason and Økland). Josephus also presents virtues that are looked upon as necessary for democracy: generosity, modesty, and reverence (Schwartz and Gruen). Josephus was also interested in another modern concept, not at least connected to British utilitarianism, that, is the pursuit of happiness (Maier). The final contribution in this section is a bridge to a modern discussion on anti-Semitism (Haaland).

Steve Mason (ch. 29) takes as his point of departure not only the discontinuity between antiquity and modern times but also the search for continuity with the Greco-Roman world that scholars in the Renaissance and Enlightenment taught us. This is clearly seen in regard to human values, values that they thought the ancients formulated with unmatched lucidity. He argues that the values of toughness and severity among the Judean people at the time of Josephus appear at odds with our present-day values. Historically, the impressions that we gain from the texts of Josephus are best understood as part of a strategy to convince his readers that the extreme demands of the laws of Moses are a reason for admiration.

Jorunn Økland (ch. 30) in her engagement with Mason's text discusses conceptual histories, translations, and gendered connotations of the Greek and Latin word for virtue: *virtus* and ἀρετή, and how they overlap semantically and where they differ. She demonstrates how the Latin word, in accordance with its etymology, is to a larger extent associated with masculinity, with an example from Spartan military culture with more legal rights and freedom for women. She also draws lines to present-day discussion regarding harshness and severity as educational values.

Daniel R. Schwartz (ch. 31) discusses another virtue in the texts of Josephus: generosity and the difference between thinking big and thinking too big. Josephus presents the story about Herodias and Gaius Caligula, saying that the emperor is "generous," that the woman "thinks too big," and how the emperor rules, at first, "high-mindedly." Generosity is shown to be typical of rulers, with a special case being the willingness to forgive insults—something lesser men would not do. It is argued that the main sense of the Greek words is "high-mindedness," a virtue that includes both generosity and thinking big and was, for Josephus, appropriate only for people endowed with it by nature, which was a matter of birth.

In his response to Schwartz, Erich S. Gruen (ch. 32) points to another essential feature in Josephus in regard to values and virtues and *paideia*, namely, εὐσέβεια or reverence for God. In the apologetic writing *Against Apion,* Josephus stresses εὐσέβεια as the queen of the virtues, encompassing a range of admirable values. Josephus finds the origins of Greek virtues in Moses's commitment to education.

Another interesting virtue that seems to be universal is presented and discussed by Daniel Maier (ch. 33): striving for happiness. In his *History of Judea,* Josephus describes Jews as people striving for happiness through their virtues in an uncertain world. His main concern was to rehabilitate Judaism externally and consolidate it internally after the war with Rome. He uses happiness as a motivation for outsiders to join and as a defense against anti-Jewish stereotypes. Accordingly, anyone adopting these values has the chance to participate in happiness. He contends that these observations may prompt a discussion of the role virtues played in pursuits of happiness over time and reveal what we can learn from their ancient transmission for modern pedagogy.

Gunnar Haaland (ch. 34) describes how Josephus's apology *Against Apion* was used by one of the fathers of the Norwegian Constitution of 1814, Christian Magnus Falsen, to argue against allowing Jews into the newly established and independent nation of Norway. He uses the example to demonstrates how ancient writings may be mobilized for negative political or educational purposes, and not only in the nineteenth century.

3.9. New Testament Literature

The early Christian literature has motivated value education in Western cultures for centuries and still seems to be essential despite a steady secularization in most European countries today. Its wide use makes it necessary to approach the texts carefully in context. Ten contributions examine readers' intuitive understanding and use of parables (Hartvigsen and Ådna), the role of faith in Jesus as Christ (πίστις) as a virtue and its role for personal progress of virtues of love and also in general (Sandnes and Engberg-Pedersen), the role of Paul's letter in general for the present scholarly discussion such as by representatives of Frankfurter school of critical theory and communitarianism (Adela Yarbro Collins). The section also has contributions that discuss the use of naming addressees that causes other audiences to internalize values presented in the text (Borchardt), the presentation in the New Testament of Jesus with Roman male elitist ideals such as authority, in a way that should make a modern application cautious, and perhaps in a less direct way (John). Other contributions discuss the historical understanding and present use of the Pauline triad "faith, love, and hope" (Mell), the relevance of benevolence as virtue in Christian *paideia* in the first century and today (Gonzalez-Alonso), as well as the use of the golden rule in the present-day sports pedagogy (Dahl).

Kirsten Marie Hartvigsen (ch. 35) discusses the narrative impact of the parable of the lost sheep and the narrated eagerness of the owner to find it (Luke 15:1–7) in light of the audience's construction of virtues and values. She sees the conclusion of the parable as suggesting the moral by emphasizing the value of repentance, but also argues that interpretations always tend to differ on the basis of previous knowledge, experiences, emotions, and ideas that the textual features evoke in each reader. The flexibility of the interpretation process indicates that the reading of biblical narratives is suitable for inclusive public religious education.

Jostein Ådna (ch. 36), in his response to Hartvigsen, offers another way of reading the text, arguing that the historical, contemporary context is better suited to grasping the essence of the parable and its lessons for the education of virtues and values today. The context of the New Testament authors must be the prime framework for the interpretations of Jesus's parables and therefore also for the identification of the inherent ideas on virtue and values, he argues. If these parables are separated from Jesus's ministry and interpreted without considering how they are integrated into the New Testament, they are isolated and alienated from the very context on which the recognition of their meaning depends.

Karl Olav Sandnes (ch. 37) presents Paul as an ancient moralist, illustrated by how he treats faith or trust (πίστις) as a virtue. Πίστις in Paul has a wide range of meanings. In some passages, it is clearly a virtue, and owing to ancient virtue logic, there are levels of virtue included. In general, virtues are seen as the result of progress on the basis of rightful thinking. Paul stands on the shoulders of this logic, but to him, virtues are "fruit of the Spirit." The idea seems to be new and idiosyncratic, but Sandnes argues that it is not without analogies among Stoic philosophers.

Troels Engberg-Pedersen (ch. 38), in his response to Sandnes, further discusses πίστις as virtue in Paul, in its ancient context as well as its relevance today, with a focus on the ethical dimensions underlying the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He disagrees with Sandnes regarding the understanding of πίστις as coming out of two different traditions: Greco-Roman tradition seeing, which is developed through *paideia* or human education, and biblical tradition viewing, which is something gained from the direct intervention of God, as something that Paul favors. He also argues that the πίστις is part of an overall virtue ethics of love (*agape*), a virtue that is also seen as an underlying ethical dimension of the declaration of human rights.

There is a similar discussion in the contribution of Adela Yarbro Collins (ch. 39). In line with Sandnes and Engberg-Pedersen, she examines the relevance of Paul for today's discussions of norms and ethics. Can we compare modern ethical theories with Pauline ones? The key norm is love, a virtue that requires that members of the community subordinate the freedom and rights given to them through Christ to the value of what is advantageous for other members. Paul's emphasis on building up the community is similar to the ecclesial ethics of Stanley Hauerwas (communitarianism), Jürgen Habermas (discourse ethics), and Bernard Lonergan (ethics of discernments); the chapter includes a discussion of how feminist and womanist ethicists have appropriated Paul to construct more inclusive ethics.

Francis Borchardt (ch. 40) takes his point of departure in the way ancient Jewish texts participate in a peculiar Greco-Roman custom by naming specific addressees at various points. Using a framework introduced by Bruno Latour, he argues that the audience takes on the role of the addressees in the script and embodies their characteristics to realize them outside of the writing. The audience, even for a moment, becomes the addressee and inhabits the fictional world, internalizing its values and striving for its goals.

Felix John (ch. 41) discusses Roman male elitist ideals in relation to the Markan Jesus. Mark characterizes Jesus in several ways as a bearer and surpasser of Roman

male elite virtues. The virtues and ideals of the Roman elite are first reconstructed in a spotlight-like manner. Then, the Markan Jesus is examined to see how he can be seen in the context of some of them, such as authority, dignity, and moderation (*auctoritas*, *dignitas*, and *moderatio)*. These observations highlight the need for a conscious approach to biblical texts in religious education.

Ulrich Mell (ch. 42) discusses the praise of Christian virtues as seen in 1 Thess 1:3 with its triad "faith, love, and hope." A triple series of expressions combines a singular expression of human activity—deed, effort, and patience—with a singular expression of human attitude—faith, love, and hope—and corresponds to ancient virtue theory, insofar as the happiness of human beings is realized in a life imbued by virtues. Mell argues that Paul later abandoned this view to give love, motivated by faith in Christ, the decisive soteriological and justificatory theological function. A development in Pauline theology can be seen in this. He thinks that the Pauline double triad can be inspirational for the unfolding of a Christian as well as religious doctrine of virtue in a God-centered life.

Pablo Gonzalez-Alonso (ch. 43) discusses the greetings in the New Testament letters as a virtue of benevolence. New Testament letters start with the phrase "someone to someone, grace and peace," a difference from Classical Greek literature that starts with "someone to someone, rejoice." The consistency of this difference, which seems to appear only in the Pauline Corpus, indicates a new nuance in the meaning of grace and peace (χάρις and εἰρήνη) in the early Christian milieu. The author studies the use of these terms to determine the relevance of benevolence in Christian *paideia*.

Dagmar G. M. Dahl (ch. 44) discusses an ethical maxim in the New Testament, the golden rule as a modern norm for living and behaving in sports and sports pedagogy. She draws on the approach of the Swiss philosopher Peter Bieri who sees human dignity as a "certain way of living a human life." This offers the possibility of associating his concept in practice with the golden rule (Matt 7:12).

3.10. Pedagogical Challenges Today

In this last section of the book, we return to modern and more general issues for the understanding of values today with two contributions.

In the first chapter, Ole Andreas Kvamme (ch. 45) discusses the problem of impartiality and normativity in regard to the teaching of sustainability as a value in education. He takes his point of departure from the norm and value of the impartiality of public education (state schools) in relation to the relatively strong normative claims of sustainable development. Education is supposed to provide space for a plurality of worldviews and opinions encouraging independence, while at the same time, the sustainability agenda forms normative demands that are both ethical and political. He discusses different solutions to the dilemma. Kvamme notes that what is called the value turn in current educational policy may be seen as a response to this situation. He proposes that the protection of life on earth should be acknowledged as a vital concern guiding purpose, content, and practices.

In the last chapter of the book, Paul Otto Brunstad (ch. 46) presents what he calls "the art of hesitation in education." Hesitation is what he thinks is a forgotten faculty

in an age of constant acceleration, in which every form of slowing down is regarded as an impediment to progress and efficiency. When we are unable to frame or name what we encounter, we need more time to provide a relevant response or to make a well-judged decision, but we also accept the finitude of our human rationality, mastery, and control. A new generation therefore needs educational help to foster and develop a more reluctant, reflective, and receptive way of being in the world, he argues.

4. Five Essential Insights for Value Education Today

At the end of our introduction, we would like to highlight five insights that we deem especially worth mentioning in our attempt to summarize the many contributions of this edited book on contacts between *paideia* and present-day value education.

First, the character of *paideia* or *Bildung* itself is of special interest today for value education and it is here that historical investigations can teach or at least remind of what is at stake. When it comes to moral and ethical issues, the content or ideals of *Bildung/danning* or *paideia* have differed, but it has always been a matter of transformation, not just formation, as Brinkmann argues. Although the modern concept of *Bildung* is connected to ancient *paideia*, the general frames, aims, or purpose of the idea have changed several times since antiquity. There are several links and lines between past and present here; for example, the encyclical or broad introduction of subjects and the view of these subjects as valuable in their own right and not primarily instrumental in increasing literacy or improving mathematical "competence." At the same time, we may see education as always a risky business, and a diverse world of cultures, religions, and secular worldviews naturally creates an uncertainty that is novel to our common world and that questions the traditional and collective parts of identity building. In addition, there are also negative views on *danning* as being too optimistic. The historical texts are aware of the fact that *paideia* is not always possible and even may not be fruitful for the common good.

Second, the understanding of values seems to vary and it is difficult to form a uniform understanding, in spite of the focus that the notion has been given in official documents for education. There was no distinct concept of moral value in premodern times, a fact that makes the notion even more uncertain for its use as a concept by historical scholars. Perhaps it is obvious, but the relationship between the phenomena values and virtues should be further explored for present purposes in education.

Third, the relationships between categories of knowing and knowledge (just, true beliefs), valuing and values (judgments, wise considerations, reflection, praxis), and the virtue of practical wisdom (φρόνησις), and willing and actions (acting or operating) seems to be a primary concern today as in the past. They correlate to the Platonic categories of justice (willing), truth (knowing), and beauty (valuing) and to the categories of the European qualification framework for competence through education: knowledge (knowing), skills (willing), and autonomy/responsibility (valuing). In modernized-Greek-based terms we may call them epistemology, axiology, and praxeology. These three categories of human endeavors have followed European education since the early days of Greek philosophy, in particular as seen in Plato and

Aristotle. They turn up constantly among the contributions of this book and turn up in psychological approaches to "learning" theories that teacher education encourages their students to study. We think that the connections with the past on theories of the relationship between the ancient categories of knowing, valuing, and willing should be made clear to teacher, students, and educators in general, and also that the psychological and formal learning theories will benefit from and even are dependent on such a philosophical grounding and historical consciousness. Pedagogical investigations and empirical educational research need these kinds of pedagogical concepts (education as *Bildung or danning*) for their theory-building.

Fourth, the development of core human rights is a modern invention. The idea of human rights or the idea of rights did not exist in premodern times; there are traces, perhaps, for example, in the Bible. It seems more appropriate to say that the values represented by the human rights declarations are partly based on values found in the Bible and other ancient texts. They are indirectly present. The idea of there being universal rights in themselves might look well established but is less practiced around the world and would benefit, we believe, from further studies of the historical roots of both established and new values. May the idea of things having value in themselves be extended to nature, and if so, is there a historical or biblical background for such a value that may provide it with an additional justification?

Fifth, the place of religions in value education within the frame of secularized yet still religious and diverse societies is a constant challenge for state-organized schools. This diversity may lead to uncertainty but should not lead to positions of absolutism, skepticism, or relativism of knowledge and moral values. All these epistemological positions of knowledge were established in the Greco-Roman world, and not unsurprisingly, still connect us to ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, as well as ancient religious thinkers and sages like the Preacher in Ecclesiastes.

Bibliography

Andersen, Øivind, ed. *Dannelse, humanitas, paideia*. [ET: *Bildung*, *Humanitas and Paideia*.] Oslo: Sypress, 1999.

Arendt, Hannah. *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought*. Middlesex: Penguin, 2006.

Asheim, Ivar. *Hva betyr holdninger: Studier i dydsetikk*. [ET: *What Do Attitudes Mean? Studies in Virtue Ethics*.] Oslo: Tano Aschehoug, 1997.

Berger, Peter. *The Many Altars of Modernity: Toward a Paradigm for Religion in a Pluralist Age*. Boston: de Gruyter, 2014.

Berger, Peter, and Samuel P. Huntington. *Many Globalizations: Cultural Diversity in the Contemporary World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Biesta, Gert. "Taking the Angle of the Teacher." *Scottish Educational Review* 55 (2023): 175–91. https://doi.org/10.1163/27730840-bja10014.

———. "Why 'What Works' Still Won't Work: From Evidence-based Education to Value-based Education." *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 29 (2010): 491–503. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11217-010-9191-x.

Darnell, Catherine A., and Kristján Kristjánsson, eds. *Virtues and Virtue Education in Theory and Practice: Are Virtues Local or Universal?* Routledge Research in Character and Virtue Education. Oxford: Routledge, 2021.

Dörpinghaus, Andreas, Andreas Poenitsch, and Lothar Wigger. *Einführung in die Theorie der Bildung*. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2006.

Fuglseth, Kåre S. "Between Past and Future in Religious Education: The Categorical Answer." Pages 209–22 in *Religious Education on the Move: Challenging the Unknown Future of Religious Education*. Edited by Ina Ter Avest, Cok Bakker, Peter Schreiner, Julie Ipgrave, and Silke Leonhard. Religious Diversity and Education in Europe 41. Münster: Waxmann, 2020.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. 4th ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1975.

Hadot, Pierre. *Exercises spirituels et philosophique antique.* New, expanded ed. Paris: Albin Michel, 2002.

Harrison, Tom, and David Walker, eds. *The Theory and Practice of Virtue Education* Oxford: Routledge, 2018. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315265353.

Hart, James. G., and Lester Embree, eds. *Phenomenology of Values and Valuing*. Contributions to Phenomenology 28. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 1997. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-017-2608-5.

Hogan, Karen, Matthew Goff, and Emma Wasserman, eds. *Pedagogy in Ancient Judaism and Early Christianity*. Ancient Judaism and Its Literature 41. Atlanta: SBL Press, 2017.

Hopmann, Stefan. "Restrained Teaching: The Common Core of Didaktik." *European Educational Research Journal* (2007): 109–24. https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2007.6.2.109.

Jaeger, Werner. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Volume 1: *Archaic Greece, the Mind of Athens*. Translated by Gilbert Highet. New York: Oxford University Press, 1939.

———. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Volume 2: *In Search of the Divine Centre*. Translated by Gilbert Highet. New York: Oxford University Press. 1943.

———. *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture*. Volume 3: *The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato*. New York: Oxford University Press. 1944.

Joas, Hans. *Die Entstehung der Werte.* Suhrkam Taschenbuch Wissenschaft 1416. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999.

Kraut, Richard, ed. *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics*. Blackwell Guide to Great Works. Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2006.

Krznaric, Roman. *History for Tomorrow: Inspiration from the Past for the Future of Humanity.* London: Penguin, 2024.

Liddell, Henry Georg, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie. *A Greek-English Lexicon*. New ed. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon, 1940.

Malina, Bruce J. *The New Testament World: Insights from Cultural Anthropology*. Atlanta: John Knox, 1981.

McGuirk, James. "Perspectives on Democracy, Citizenship and Value Education in the Norwegian School." Pages 57–67 in *Education in Europe: Contemporary Approaches across the Continent*. Edited by Tom Feldges. Routledge Education Studies. London: Routledge, 2023. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003223528-7.

Nussbaum, Martha C. *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

Polak, Regina, and Patrick Rohs, eds. *Values, Politics, Religion: The European Values Study; In-depth Analysis, Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Future Prospects*. Cham: Springer Nature, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31364-6_2.

Schroeder, Mark. "Value Theory." *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Edited by Edward N. Zalta and Uri Nodelman. Stanford: Stanford University, 2024. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2024/entries/value-theory/.

Prange, Klaus. "'Bildung': A Paradigm Regained?" *European Educational Research Journal* 3 (2004): 501–9. https://doi.org/10.2304/eerj.2004.3.2.5.

Zurawski, Jason M., and Gabriele Boccaccini, eds. *Second Temple Jewish "Paideia" in Context*. Beihefte zur Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 228. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110546972.