Gail SundermanHeinrich Mintrop

Centralized Management of School Improvement with Quota and Sanctions: The US-American Experiment with High-Stakes Accountability in Schools Serving Disadvantaged Populations

Shortlink: https://www.waxmann.com/artikelART100404

free download

Abstract

In the last two decades or so, governments in the United States have experimented with systems of school quality assurance and control that heavily rely on the power of quantitative growth targets combined with stringent sanctions in guiding and incentivizing school development efforts from the center. The design features of these systems have indeed triggered pro-active responses on the part of schools and local administrative units, as intended. Yet, they have been unable to achieve their intended goals. Instead, they produced unexpected organizational dysfunctionalities and resulted in an undesirable learning culture.

Keywords
accountability systems, performance incentives, school quality, work motivation, school improvement, centralization